Turkish Views of Foreign Actors Diverge from Erdoğan’s East-West Balance

Under the Erdoğan presidency, Turkey has sought to pursue relations with both the East and West, attempting to be a rising yet nonaligned power with strategically diverse relationships that bolster the state’s economic and security interests. Does this reflect what the Turkish public wants? Recent survey results from Pew Research’s Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey, fielded January 29-March 11, finds a Turkish public leaning more toward Europe than in the past.

Generally, Turks are wary of other international actors, as the public expresses more negative opinions toward every state asked about than positive ones. This is particularly evident with the United States: eight in 10 (80%) say they have an unfavorable opinion of the country (18% favorable). On the other end of the scale, Turks have net-negative—but comparably favorable—opinions of the European Union (EU) and NATO: Turkish favorability of the EU, for instance, has risen to 46 percent, up from 34 percent in 2019. This may reflect recent developments of Turkey showing renewed interest in EU accession last year despite little progress on requirements and its existing membership in NATO. These more positive views of the European Union also reflect growing Turkish support for Turkey becoming a member in the EU: 56 percent, up from 40 percent in 2017.

In recent years, Turks have become more favorably inclined toward both the European Union and NATO. Favorable views of the EU have risen 12 percentage points since 2019, and favorable views of NATO increased by 21 percentage points over the same time period. Moreover, while opinions of Russia and China grew to be more favorable between 2011 and 2019, this year’s poll finds that total favorability toward both Russia and China has fallen about 10 points each (Russia: 39% to 30%; China: 37% to 26%), though both are still viewed more favorably than the United States. This drop in favorability comes in spite of Turkey’s recent application to join BRICS, an economic bloc dominated by Russia and China.

These shifts in public attitudes in many ways run counter to Erdoğan’s interest in aligning with China and Russia. With Turkish views of the EU and NATO growing more favorable over the past five years, while views of China and Russia have deteriorated, this kind of pivot will be increasingly unpopular with the Turkish public. Indeed, it is possible that Turkey's increasing democratic backsliding and turn toward authoritarianism are also playing a role in how Turks view other states and international organizations. As the Turkish government seeks a more active role in world affairs and actively attempts to work on both sides of the East-West divide, the split in the Turkish public’s favorability between European institutions on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, may play a more prominent role in public debates about the future of Turkey.