

Executive Summary

The 2024 presidential contest, like those in 2016 and 2020, features a clash of worldviews on US foreign policy.

For the Democrats, current Vice President Kamala Harris is the most recent Democratic candidate to act as [standard-bearer](#) of the ‘rules-based order.’ She has largely put forth a platform that advocates for the traditional American foreign policy of the past 70 years, centering the importance of allies and the US commitment to defending those allies if they come under attack. On the economic front, she has promised to protect American workers and plans to continue the industrial policies of the Biden administration that are pushing large investments into US manufacturing capacity as well as in high-tech sectors. While she has declared support for immigration reforms that would create more pathways to citizenship for undocumented migrants, she has also pledged to continue measures aimed at reducing the flow of asylum-seekers to the US-Mexico border.


For the third consecutive time in the past eight years, former President Donald Trump is the Republican nominee. As in his previous campaigns, Trump has [advocated for](#) a United States not necessarily less involved in world affairs, but less multilateralist and looking out for its own interests first and foremost. If he prevails, Washington may no longer stand by its commitments to defend allies in the case of attack. As a part of his proposed retrenchment, Trump has suggested withdrawing troops from key allied nations around the world or withdrawing from specific defense treaties altogether. His economic policies promise 20 percent tariffs across the board on imported products in an effort to correct trade imbalances—though many experts say this would effectively result in a tax on the American public. And on immigration, one of his signature issues, he has not only promised to stop migration from unwanted countries of origin but to deport immigrants already in the country through state-run [deportation](#) camps.

Which of these platforms most closely aligns with the preferences of the American public? Just as there have been foreign policy swings since 2016 between the Trump and Biden administrations, the American public’s foreign policy mood has also alternated over the past eight years.

When Trump was in office, [Chicago Council Surveys](#) captured how everyday Americans broke with the president’s more isolationist ideas. Surveys from 2018 to 2020 reported some of the highest levels of public support since the Council’s first poll in 1974 for an active US role in the world (Figure A). In addition, public support for defending allies (see Appendix Table 16) and endorsing international trade rose to new heights during Trump’s tenure (Figure B).

Fig A: Support for Active US Role in World Affairs


Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (% active part)



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Fig. B: Utility of International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)



June 21-July, 1, 2024 | n=2,106
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
Since taking office in 2021, President Joe Biden has pursued a more active foreign policy agenda, reinvigorating relationships with other countries and uniting US allies to assist Ukraine economically and militarily against Russian forces. Additionally, after the October 7 Hamas attacks, Biden provided both US diplomatic and military aid to Israel in its war with Hamas. At the same time, as the rest of the world did, the United States dealt with a wave of inflation [resulting largely](#) from the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing challenges to supply chains, as well as disruptions to energy and food markets caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the face of higher consumer prices, some Americans now question whether US economic and military aid to other countries—even if they are allies—is warranted.

These combined factors have taken a toll on everyday Americans’ backing an active US role in world affairs (56% in Figure A, a near-record low) and their willingness to assist other countries. Many think US leaders should direct their resources to dealing with domestic challenges instead of international ones (Figure C and Appendix Table 2).

Fig. C: US Responsibility in World Affairs

Which of these statements comes closest to your own view? (%)

■ Overall ■ Republican ■ Democrat ■ Independent



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This does not mean that the American public is turning wholly isolationist. Majorities continue to recognize the importance of both alliances and superior military power to US national security and continue to favor international trade. While majorities support US assistance to both Ukraine and Israel, there are key differences between Republicans and Democrats on these conflicts (see Figures 9, 10, and 14).

But in an election year, most Americans [are focused on](#) issues closer to home such as inflation, the economy, and American democracy. Many think the United States is overextending itself at a time when there are significant domestic problems requiring attention that they consider more important in their voting decisions than the wars in Ukraine or the Middle East. And the very public costs of US assistance to Ukraine and Israel at a time of high consumer prices at home have likely contributed to these perceptions.

Still, Americans overall do not want a radical change to US foreign policy. Support remains strong for the core pillars of US foreign policy, and the past 50 years of Chicago Council polling suggests that is likely to continue no matter who wins the presidency.

Introduction

The 2024 presidential election will carry significant consequences for the future of the United States on both domestic and foreign policy, being the third consecutive election in the past decade that pits an internationalist against a nationalist view of the American role in the world. The American public has experienced both approaches in consecutive Trump and Biden presidencies and is once again presented with contrasting plans for the best way forward. While it is domestic policy that is often top of mind for voters in presidential elections, where do Americans stand on these competing outlooks for the role of the United States in the world? As Chicago Council Surveys show, the US public seems to be somewhere in the middle. Moreover, the past decade of research suggests that on key foreign policy issues, public opinion often appears to move counter to the policy platforms enacted by the sitting president.

In the first two years of Trump's presidency, the percentage of Americans who believed the United States should play an active part in world affairs soared to new highs—levels not seen since just after the September 11 attacks in 2002. Support for defending key allies such as Japan, Korea and the Baltic NATO countries also hit their highest points. These spikes came as then-President Trump was actively trying to pull the United States back from a more engaged role in the world, threatening to end traditional alliances, and launching a trade war with China.

Since taking office in 2021, President Biden has executed a more activist foreign policy agenda. His administration has united US allies to continue economic and military support of Ukraine against Russian forces and maintained US military aid to Israel in its war with Hamas. At the same time, Biden officials kept many of the same tariffs that Trump imposed on Beijing, and they have doubled down on industrial policies designed to boost the United States in its economic competition with China.

The 2024 Chicago Council Survey shows that while public support for alliances, NATO, and international trade remains solid, only 56 percent of Americans now think the United States should play an active role in world affairs—one of the lowest levels ever recorded since the survey question was first asked in 1974. Only a slight majority say the benefits of maintaining the US role in the world outweigh the costs. And half the US public believes that because the United States has limited resources, its leaders should focus on problems at home and reduce America's involvement in world affairs.

In a growing trend, partisanship is a core part of understanding differences in views on the US role in the world. There are deep divides between Republicans and Democrats on a range of issues—from Ukraine to immigration—and the two parties seem to be moving in opposite directions on core attitudes toward the US role in

the world. But there is often less division than imagined when it comes to long-standing pillars of US foreign policy, such as US alliances and the importance of US military superiority.

I. Downward Shift in Public Support for US International Involvement


Over the past four years, the Biden administration has sought to manage multiple conflicts and competitions by taking an active approach to world affairs. For their part, a significant portion of the American public seems to think the United States might be at risk of overextending itself. Fewer than six in 10 Americans (56%) think the United States should [play an active role in world affairs](#), the second-lowest percentage recorded since 1974 (the lowest was 54% in 1982). And more than four in 10 (43%) say the country should stay out of world affairs, the highest level ever recorded in the Chicago Council Survey's 50-year history.

As has been the case over the past decade, Democrats are more positive about an active role for the United States. In 2024, more than two-thirds of Democrats (68%, 31% stay out of world affairs) think it is best for the United States to play an active role. While this reading is still solidly supportive, it is down from an all-time high of 78 percent among Democrats in 2020. That high-water mark could be interpreted as an expressed corrective to the more isolationist foreign policies put in place by the Trump administration, which included withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement, unilaterally terminating the Iran nuclear deal, and demanding increased payments from allies in exchange for having their security guaranteed by the United States.

Among Republicans, only a bare majority currently think it is best for the United States to play an active role in world affairs (54%, 44% stay out), though this has increased from 47 percent favoring an active role in 2023. Both 2023 and 2024 readings are a far cry from previous highs of 77 percent in 2002 and 2006, when Republicans were the greater champions for active engagement, and a signal of how far the Republican electorate has moved on foreign policy over the past decades.

Fig. 1: Support for Active US Role in World Affairs

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (% active part)




Narrow Majority See More Advantages Than Disadvantages to US Global Role

The appropriate level of US international engagement appears to be closely tied to perceptions about the required commitments to undertake US involvement. Half the American public (50% combined) either says that the United States [has enough resources](#) to take care of its own problems at home as well as take a leading role in world affairs (33%) or that, because the United States is the world’s strongest and richest country, it has the responsibility to take a leading role in world affairs (17%). But the other half disagree, saying that the United States has limited resources and its own problems at home, so it needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs (49%).

Consistent with their higher level of support for an active US role in the world, two-thirds of Democrats (65%) say either the United States has the resources to handle a leading role while also taking care of problems at home (39%) or the United States has a responsibility to take a leading international role because it is the world’s strongest and wealthiest nation (26%). By contrast, majorities of Republicans (57%) and Independents (54%) say the United States needs to reduce its global


involvement because of its limited resources and problems at home—though, as in previous questions, sizable minorities of both partisan groups take the other position.



At the same time, a slight majority of the overall US public (54%) continues to say the [benefits of maintaining the US role in the world outweigh the costs](#), a figure that is largely unchanged from previous surveys. Here too, two-thirds of Democrats (65%) are convinced that the benefits of maintaining the US role outweigh the costs, while Republicans and Independents are evenly divided (49% each). But the divided responses on this question overall underscore that Americans are concerned about the costs of US involvement on global issues.

Fig. 3: Benefits of Maintaining US Role in World

Overall, when it comes to maintaining the US role in the world, do you think: *The benefits outweigh the costs (%)*



II. Declining Support for US Economic and Military Assistance to Other Countries

Nearly each year of the Biden administration has been accompanied by an end to a major conflict or the beginning of a new one. In 2021, the United States [completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan](#), ending 20 years of US military deployment in that nation. In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, starting a war that continues to this day. And in 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale terror attack against Israel, sparking a massive Israeli response that now extends into both Gaza and neighboring Lebanon.

The Biden administration’s approach to both ongoing conflicts has been to provide aid to Ukraine and Israel, rather than involving US forces directly in the fighting. Although a majority of Americans continue to say foreign assistance is an effective method to achieve US foreign policy goals, that confidence has declined since the


start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and Israel’s war with Hamas beginning in 2023. A smaller majority now than in 2022 say that economic assistance (62% vs. 73% in 2022) and military aid (67%, down from 75%) are somewhat or very effective foreign policy tools. Furthermore, an increasing percentage of Americans now say that [federal spending](#) on economic aid (51%, up from 41% in 2020) and military aid (50%, up from 42% in 2022) to other nations should be reduced. This suggests that the extended nature of both conflicts has demonstrated real limits to what US foreign assistance can achieve.

Support for US Assistance to Ukraine Weaker than at Start of War

As the war in Ukraine stretches into its third year, American assistance to Kyiv has become a [contentious and increasingly partisan issue](#). Though a majority of the public overall [continues to support](#) aiding Ukraine with economic (58%) and military assistance (57%), support has fallen significantly from the initial highs of March 2022 when eight in 10 Americans favored US economic (78%) and military (79%) aid.

Fig. 4: Support for Sending Economic Assistance to Ukraine


In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you support or oppose the United States: Providing economic assistance to Ukraine (% support)



Support for aid to Ukraine has declined among all partisan groups over the past two years, but the decline has been especially sharp among Republicans. Between March 2022 and February 2024, Republican support for sending economic aid dropped by 34 percentage points, and support for sending military aid fell by 35 percentage points. Today, majorities of Democrats and Independents continue to support assistance to Kyiv compared to just 45 percent of Republicans.

Fig. 5: Support for Sending Military Assistance to Ukraine

In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you support or oppose the United States: Sending additional arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (% support)




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In addition to reacting to [opposition](#) from some congressional GOP leaders, the drops in public support for sending economic and military aid to Ukraine may be partially due to the declining salience of the conflict and perception of threat that it poses to Americans. [In March 2022](#)—just after the war broke out—two-thirds of Americans (67%) cited Russia’s territorial ambitions as a critical threat to US interests. Now, just five in 10 Americans (50%) say the same.

Fig. 6: Critical Threat of Russia’s Territorial Ambitions

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. **Russia’s territorial ambitions** (% critical threat)




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Support for US Role in Middle East, but Also for Conditioning US Military Aid to Israel

Since its beginning in October 2023, the Israel-Gaza war has also divided the American public along partisan lines. And in a time where foreign assistance is already being called into question, the US role in the Israel-Gaza war—and its [high cost](#) to American taxpayers—may be another factor depressing public support for an active part in world affairs.


Across the board, Americans believe the United States is [playing a positive role](#) in resolving key challenges facing the Middle East (61%), and a plurality of Americans (42%) believe the United States is either striking the right balance (22%) in its support for Israel or not supporting it enough (20%). However, nearly a third (30%) say the United States is supporting Israel too much, a view more commonly held by Democrats (40%) and Independents (34%). By contrast, Republicans are more likely to say the United States is not supporting Israel enough (40%).



A plurality of Americans (43%) also say the United States has provided Israel with either the right amount (26%) or not enough (17%) military aid, while a third (34%) say it has provided too much military assistance. Partisans are again divided: pluralities of Democrats (42%) and Independents (39%) say the United States has provided Israel with too much military aid, while Republicans are more likely to say the United States has not given Israel enough military assistance (34%).

Fig. 8: Current US Military Aid to Israel

Do you think the United States is providing too much, not enough or the right amount of military aid to Israel? (%)




June 21-July, 1, 2024 | n=2,106
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While 60 percent of Americans say that the United States should support Israel until the remaining hostages are returned, a slight majority (53%) also favor restricting US military aid to Israel so that it cannot be used in military operations against Palestinians. Nearly seven in 10 (68%) Democrats favor such restrictions. Independents are more divided in their views, but more than half (54%) support restricting US military aid to Israel. By contrast, the majority of Republicans (59%) oppose such restrictions.

Finally, Americans are hesitant to [aid reconstruction efforts](#) in Gaza following the conflict. Nearly six in 10 Americans (57%) oppose the United States playing a leading role in the reconstruction of the enclave, something experts say would [cost more than \\$80 billion](#) to complete. Just over half of Democrats (51%) support this policy, while majorities of Republicans (71%) and Independents (58%) oppose US leadership in this area.

Fig. 9: US Policy on Gaza Conflict

Do you favor or oppose the United States ...? (% support)



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Council-Ipsos polling shows that Democrats have grown more critical of Israel's role in the Gaza conflict as well as in the broader Middle East. Their greater concern, relative to Republicans, for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the plight of Palestinian civilians is driving their more critical views of US support for Israeli military actions.

III: Enduring Support for US Alliance System


While support for an active American role in world affairs has declined, the 2024 survey also demonstrates durable support for some of the fundamental components of traditional US foreign policy. Americans view the US alliance system as beneficial to the United States, favor maintaining US military bases in allied nations around the world, want to maintain America's superior military power, and are willing—in some cases—to use that military power to defend allies.

Majorities Support Maintaining US Alliances and Superior Military Power

Trump has consistently questioned the value of US alliances, which have long been considered an essential element of US global strength. While Trump has repeatedly stated that alliances do not benefit the United States, Biden and other Democrats have put allies at the forefront of their foreign policy strategy. For its part, the American public takes a [positive view of US security alliances](#): nearly two-thirds (64%) think they benefit both the United States and its allies (51%) or mostly benefit the United States (13%).

Fig. 10: American Views on US Security Alliances

As you may know, the United States has security alliances with countries around the world. Which of the following comes closest to your view. Do they: (%)



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Democrats are most emphatic about the positives of alliances, in part because they prefer a multilateral approach to international concerns.¹ In total, 74 percent of Democrats say alliances benefit either the United States and allies (58%) or the United States alone (16%). One-quarter (24%) say alliances mostly benefit allies (19%) or benefit neither (5%).

Perhaps reflecting the messaging from Trump and his surrogates, Republicans are more divided. While 55 percent say alliances benefit either the United States (10%) or the United States and allies (45%), a sizable minority of Republicans (39%) say


¹ For example, Democrats are more willing than other Americans to make decisions with allies even if it results in a policy that is not the United States' first choice (71%). A majority of Americans overall and Independents agree (58% each), though just 46 percent of Republicans are of the same mind (and 53% disagree).

they mostly benefit US allies (and 4% say they benefit neither). Independents are in-between: six in 10 (62%) consider alliances to mostly benefit either the United States or the United States and its allies (49% both, 13% US alone), but nearly four in 10 think otherwise (26% allies alone, 11% neither).

Views in support of alliances are also likely tied to the fact that maintaining those alliances are viewed as one of the most highly effective tools in the US foreign policy arsenal (46% very, 43% somewhat effective). Reflecting their general preferences for multilateral approaches, Democrats (56%) are more likely than Republicans (41%) or Independents (40%) to view alliances as a very effective approach to US foreign policy and have been more likely to say so throughout the past decade.²

Fig. 11: Maintaining Existing Alliances


*How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States - very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all? **Maintaining existing alliances** (% very effective)*



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² Full results for the 2024 iteration of this question can be found in the Appendix.

While a significant portion of Republicans also view alliances as very effective (41%), they are more likely to point to maintaining US military superiority as a very effective tool for achieving US foreign policy goals, as they have for the past decade. Six in 10 (63%) Republicans say such superiority is a very effective approach to US foreign policy, as do half of Americans overall (48%) and four in 10 Independents and Democrats (42% each).




Broad Support for American Global Military Presence

American goals of working with allies and maintaining US military superiority come together in the US [global network of military bases](#). A core component of the US alliance system, the United States maintains more than 700 military bases in roughly 80 countries. In a case of bipartisan agreement, Republicans and Democrats broadly support maintaining long-term US military bases in many countries around the world.

Majorities support long-term US bases in Germany (64%), South Korea (63%), Japan (62%), the Philippines (54%), NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (54%), and Poland (53%). In each case, majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents are in support.

Fig. 13: Support for US Military Bases Abroad

Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)



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Americans Ready to Use Force in Specific Scenarios


Americans also remain generally supportive of [coming to the defense of US allies](#) if they come under attack. The strongest support for such use is when traditional allies such as NATO or South Korea are involved. Majorities support using US troops to help a NATO ally like Germany (65%) or Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (51%) if Russia invaded. If North Korea invaded South Korea, half of Americans (51%) would support [using US troops to defend South Korea](#).

When it comes to [using US troops to aid Israel](#), partisanship plays a larger role. When polled this summer, 53 percent of Republicans and 34 percent of Democrats said they would favor using US troops to defend Israel if Israel were attacked by Iran. Similar percentages—55 percent of Republicans and 35 percent of Democrats—said the same about a situation where Israel was attacked by its neighbors.

Finally, when asked about using US troops to deal with one of the most contentious issues of the year—immigration—there are even deeper partisan divisions. While a narrow majority of Americans (53%) favor [using US troops to stop immigrants](#) coming into the country from Mexico, this is largely driven by Republicans: 84 percent are in favor, compared to half of Independents (50%) and just 30 percent of Democrats.

Fig. 14: Use of US Troops to Defend Allies

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% favor)



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
As the data show, despite Americans' concerns about the costs of the US role in the world, Americans remain strongly committed to their international alliances, and they remain focused on maintaining a strong US military. One reason for their commitment to alliances: Americans see them as a force multiplier. When asked why they view alliances as beneficial for the United States, Americans say that alliances strengthen US diplomatic (57%) and military (50%) efforts around the world. And despite the shifts in policy between the Trump and Biden administrations, support for these two basic tenets of US foreign policy has remained generally stable and strong over the past decade.

IV. Support for Trade Holds Steady

Another major source of stability in American opinion in recent years has been on trade. Americans of all political stripes continue to see the benefits of international trade for both the United States at large and for their daily lives. Majorities say international trade is good for the US economy (75%), consumers like themselves (81%), creating jobs in the United States (58%), and their own standard of living (81%). Importantly, these stances are largely bipartisan except for views on creating jobs in the United States. Here, 69 percent of Democrats take a positive view versus 47 percent of Republicans.

Fig. 15: Utility of International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)




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But there is also broad support for greater economic self-sufficiency and some trade restrictions, especially when it comes to China. Even as Americans support international trade, two-thirds (66%) favor restricting that trade in order to protect American jobs. That includes 77 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of Democrats.

Fig. 16: Support for International Trade Restrictions

Generally speaking, do you think US trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs, or have no restrictions to enable American consumers to have the most choices and the lowest prices? US trade policy should have restrictions on imported goods to protect American jobs (%)



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
Attitudes on trade restrictions may be in part formed by economic competition with China. As economic competition with China becomes more entrenched, [maintaining the United States' technological edge](#) in high-tech industries is a key goal for Americans. Six in 10 overall (60%), and similar majorities across party lines, say this is a very important goal, trailing only the goal of avoiding a military conflict with China (which 69% say is very important).

One way to maintain that edge: export controls on high-technology products. Eight in 10 Americans favor prohibiting US companies from selling sensitive high-tech products to China (79%, up from 71% in 2021), including large majorities across party lines. A majority of Americans also continue to support increased tariffs on Chinese imports. However, only a minority of Americans now favor significant reductions in US-China trade, even if it leads to greater costs for Americans (45%, down from 57% in 2021).

Fig. 17: US-China Policies

Would you support or oppose the following U.S. policies towards China? (% support)

- Increasing tariffs on products imported from China
- Limiting the number of Chinese students studying in the United States
- Significantly reduce trade between the US and China, even if this leads to greater costs for American consumers
- Prohibiting US companies from selling sensitive high-tech products to China



September 13-15, 2024 | n=1,027
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS / IPSOS


Conclusion

The American public is deeply divided as it heads into the 2024 presidential election. Topics such as the economy, immigration, and the perceived threats to democracy are major issues on which Republicans and Democrats hold starkly different views. These divisions also extend into foreign policy now more than they did a few decades ago. There are growing gaps between Democrats and Republicans in opinions of what role the United States should play in the world, best illustrated by the partisan differences on assisting Ukraine and Israel. However, these divisions have not yet fully manifested when it comes to the broader framework of US foreign policy. Americans still broadly support alliances, international trade, and the global presence of the US military, suggesting that the public would support continuity in US foreign policy no matter who wins the White House.

Appendix

Appendix Fig. 1: Effective Foreign Policy Approaches

How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States - very effect, somewhat effective, not very effective, not effective at all? (% very + somewhat effective)



June 21-July 1, 2024 | n=2,106
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Part I

Table 1. Support for Active US Engagement in World Affairs

Q3. Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?

Active part (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	67	72	68	65	4
1978	59	61	58	63	3
1982	54	64	49	55	15
1986	64	71	58	68	13
1990	62	69	61	59	8
1994	65	--	--	--	--
1998	61	66	61	60	5
2002	71	77	70	69	7
2004	67	74	65	64	9
2006	69	77	65	68	12
2008	63	72	59	60	13
2010	67	72	68	64	4
2012	61	70	60	55	10
2014	58	60	64	51	-4
2015	64	69	67	57	2
2016	64	64	70	57	-6
2017	64	64	69	59	-5
2018	70	70	75	63	-5
2019	69	69	75	64	-6
2020	68	64	78	63	-14
2021	64	61	68	62	-7
2022	60	55	68	55	-13
2023	57	47	70	53	-23
2024	56	54	68	47	-14
Stay out (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	23	19	23	26	-4
1978	29	27	32	26	-5
1982	35	27	39	35	-12
1986	27	22	34	22	-12

1990	28	22	29	32	-7
1994	29	--	--	--	--
1998	28	27	26	31	1
2002	25	20	27	26	-7
2004	30	24	33	30	-9
2006	28	21	33	30	-12
2008	36	27	40	40	-13
2010	31	27	30	34	-3
2012	38	30	39	44	-9
2014	41	40	35	48	5
2015	35	30	32	42	-2
2016	35	36	29	41	7
2017	35	34	31	39	3
2018	29	29	24	35	5
2019	30	31	24	35	7
2020	30	34	22	35	12
2021	35	38	32	36	6
2022	39	44	31	43	13
2023	42	53	29	46	24
2024	43	44	31	52	13

Table 2. US Responsibility in World Affairs

Q384. Which of these statements comes closest to your own view?

Because the United States is the world's strongest and richest country, it has the responsibility to take a leading role in world affairs (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	33	30	39	31	-9
Because the United States has limited resources and its own problems at home, it needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	49	57	35	54	22
The United States has enough resources to take care of its own problems at home as well as take a leading role in world affairs (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	17	13	26	14	-13

Table 3. Cost and Benefit of Maintaining the US Role in the World

Q13. Overall, when it comes to maintaining the US role in the world, do you think:

The costs outweigh the benefits (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2021	42	47	35	45	12
2022	42	46	34	47	12
2023	41	43	34	45	9
2024	45	49	35	50	14
The benefits outweigh the costs (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2021	56	52	64	53	-12
2022	56	52	65	51	-13
2023	58	55	65	53	-10
2024	54	49	65	49	-16

Part II

Table 4. Efficacy of Foreign Aid

Q8. How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States - very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all?

Q8/7. Economic aid to other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	11	7	17	8	-10
2017	17	9	27	15	-18
2022	20	11	32	16	-21
2024	14	6	24	11	-18
Somewhat effective (%)					
2015	47	42	53	45	-11
2017	48	44	52	47	-8
2022	53	49	56	52	-7
2024	48	44	54	46	-10
Not very effective (%)					
2015	30	37	24	31	13
2017	27	39	17	28	22
2022	21	33	10	24	23

2024	27	38	17	29	21
Not effective at all (%)					
2015	10	12	5	14	7
2017	7	7	3	9	4
2022	5	6	2	8	4
2024	9	12	4	13	8

Q8/8. Military aid to other countries					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	12	12	15	8	-3
2017	12	9	17	11	-8
2022	16	11	23	14	-12
2024	16	10	23	14	-13
Somewhat effective (%)					
2015	48	47	52	45	-5
2017	56	62	56	52	6
2022	59	61	59	58	2
2024	51	54	54	46	0
Not very effective (%)					
2015	29	30	25	31	5
2017	25	24	21	29	3
2022	20	23	17	22	6
2024	24	29	18	27	11
Not effective at all (%)					
2015	10	9	6	14	3
2017	6	4	4	8	0
2022	4	4	1	5	3
2024	8	7	5	13	2

Table 5. Federal Budget Allocations

Q25. Below is a list of present federal government programs. For each, please select whether you feel it should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same.

Q25/5. Economic aid to other nations					
Cut back (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	56	57	56	57	1
1978	50	50	49	53	1
1982	54	55	53	56	2
1986	48	51	44	50	7

1990	61	65	56	65	9
1994	58	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	48	52	45	50	7
2002	50	50	46	54	4
2004	64	69	65	61	4
2008	55	56	48	61	8
2010	60	67	51	62	16
2014	60	67	49	66	18
2017	51	69	37	51	32
2020	41	60	23	44	37
2024	51	69	34	53	35

Q25/4. Military aid to other nations					
Cut back (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1974	71	69	71	73	-2
1978	64	65	63	69	2
1982	65	58	66	69	-8
1986	62	56	66	64	-10
1990	73	71	73	78	-2
1994	68	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	55	52	54	60	-2
2002	48	42	51	53	-9
2004	65	60	71	63	-11
2008	59	49	67	60	-18
2010	60	55	60	63	-5
2014	59	57	56	64	1
2017	50	55	43	53	12
2020	42	47	36	46	11
2022	42	53	29	46	24
2024	50	60	39	54	21

Table 6. US Policy toward Russia-Ukraine War

Q250. In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you support or oppose the United States:

Q250/1 Providing economic assistance to Ukraine					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	50	50	53	48	-3

March 2022	78	74	84	74	-11
July 2022	71	64	82	66	-18
November 2022	66	50	81	64	-31
September 2023	61	47	76	58	-29
February 2024	58	40	78	54	-39
June 2024	58	45	72	57	-27
Oppose (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	47	47	44	50	3
March 2022	20	26	13	22	13
July 2022	27	35	16	32	19
November 2022	32	49	17	32	32
September 2023	37	52	22	40	30
February 2024	38	58	20	42	38
June 2024	27	51	25	40	26

Q250/3 Sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	40	47	39	36	8
March 2022	79	80	83	76	-3
July 2022	72	68	79	68	-11
November 2022	65	55	76	63	-21
September 2023	63	50	77	60	-27
February 2024	58	45	75	54	-31
June 2024	57	45	71	54	-26

Oppose (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	56	50	57	61	-7
March 2022	18	19	14	21	5
July 2022	26	30	19	29	11
November 2022	32	44	22	32	22
September 2023	35	49	20	38	29
February 2024	38	53	23	41	30
June 2024	39	51	26	42	25

Table 7. Threats to the Vital Interests of the United States in 10 Years

Q5. Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:

Q5/10 Russia's territorial ambitions					
Critical threat (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	38	48	35	34	13
2015	32	39	28	30	11
2016	30	32	31	29	1
March 2022	67	66	73	64	-7
July 2022	60	56	68	56	-12
2024	50	48	60	42	-12

Table 8. Role in Resolving Key Problems Facing the Middle East

Q325A. In your opinion, are the following countries and groups playing a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative role in resolving the key problems facing the Middle East?

Q325A/1. United States					
Very or somewhat positive (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap

2015	69	69	74	65	-5
2024	61	68	66	52	2

Table 9. US Support for Israel in Gaza War

Q704. Thinking about the Israel Gaza war, do you think the United States is:

Supporting Israel too much (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	30	15	40	34	-25
Not supporting Israel enough (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	20	40	8	14	32
Striking about the right balance (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	22	23	24	19	-1
Not sure (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	27	21	27	31	-1

Table 10. US Military Aid to Israel

Q726. Do you think the United States is providing too much, not enough, or the right amount of military aid to Israel?

Too much (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	34	19	42	39	-22
Not enough (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	17	34	7	14	27
Right amount (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	26	29	28	22	2
Not sure (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	23	17	23	25	-7

Table 11. US Policy toward Israel-Gaza War

Q728. Do you favor or oppose the United States...?

Q728/1 Supporting Israel militarily until the hostages are returned					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	60	76	55	52	22

Q728/2 Supporting Israel militarily until Hamas is dismantled or destroyed					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	49	67	41	44	26

Q728/3 Playing a leading role in the reconstruction of Gaza					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	37	24	51	36	-27

Q728/4 Officially recognizing a Palestinian state					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	50	33	66	49	-33

Table 12. Restriction of US Military Aid to Israel

Q725B. Do you support or oppose putting restrictions on US military aid to Israel so that cannot use that aid toward military operations against Palestine?

Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	53	35	68	54	-32
Oppose (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	42	59	27	41	32

Part III

Table 13. View of US Security Alliances

Q33S. As you may know, the United States has security alliances with countries around the world. Which of the following comes closest to your view. Do they:

Q33S. Opinions on US Security Alliances (%)					
Mostly benefit the United States(%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	13	10	16	13	-6
Mostly benefit our allies (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	28	39	19	26	20
Benefit both the US and our allies (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	51	45	58	49	-13
Benefit neither (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	7	4	5	11	-1

Table 14. Effective US Foreign Policy Approaches

Q8. How effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States - very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all?

Q8/5. Maintaining existing alliances					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	38	37	41	34	-4
2015	32	31	37	26	-6
2016	40	40	45	34	-5
2017	49	43	56	47	-13
January 2020	55	56	60	51	-4
2022	54	50	62	49	-12
2024	46	41	56	40	-15
Somewhat effective (%)					
2014	49	51	49	49	2

2015	52	51	52	54	-1
2016	50	48	49	52	-1
2017	42	48	35	44	13
January 2020	35	41	30	37	11
2022	39	43	33	41	10
2024	43	49	36	44	13
Not very effective (%)					
2014	9	9	7	11	2
2015	11	12	7	13	5
2016	7	9	4	9	5
2017	7	7	6	7	1
January 2020	5	3	4	7	-1
2022	6	6	4	8	2
2024	8	8	5	10	3
Not effective at all (%)					
2014	3	1	2	4	-1
2015	4	4	2	6	2
2016	2	2	1	3	1
2017	1	0	2	2	-2
January 2020	3	1	5	4	-4
2022	1	1	0	2	1
2024	3	1	2	6	-1

Q8/2. Maintaining US military superiority					
Very effective (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	42	50	40	39	10
2014	47	54	43	45	11
2015	40	50	37	34	13
2016	47	61	43	42	18
2017	47	66	38	43	28
January 2020	53	80	39	46	41
2022	51	66	42	48	24
2024	48	63	42	42	21
Somewhat effective (%)					
2012	42	40	44	41	-4
2014	37	34	42	37	-8
2015	40	35	45	40	-10
2016	38	30	43	39	-13

2017	37	29	42	38	-13
January 2020	35	19	42	39	-23
2022	36	27	43	36	-16
2024	36	27	43	37	-16
Not very effective (%)					
2012	12	9	13	13	-4
2014	12	10	12	15	-2
2015	13	9	12	17	-3
2016	11	7	12	14	-5
2017	12	4	15	15	-11
January 2020	7	0	11	9	-11
2022	10	6	12	12	-6
2024	10	8	11	13	-3
Not effective at all (%)					
2012	3	1	2	5	-1
2014	2	2	2	3	0
2015	6	4	4	8	0
2016	3	2	2	4	0
2017	3	1	4	4	-3
January 2020	4	0	6	4	-6
2022	2	1	2	4	-1
2024	5	2	3	8	-1

Table 15. Support for Long-Term Military Bases Abroad

Q40. Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places?

Q40/1. Japan					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	63	67	60	63	7
2004	52	56	52	50	4
2006	57	66	52	57	14
2008	58	67	50	57	17
2010	49	56	46	47	10
2012	51	57	49	51	8
2014	55	59	50	56	9
2016	60	69	57	56	12

2018	65	72	65	61	7
2021 Trilateral	59	65	54	59	11
2022	67	72	64	66	8
2023	63	65	62	62	3
2024	62	69	61	59	8

Q40/3. South Korea					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	67	74	66	64	8
2004	62	71	62	56	9
2006	62	73	57	61	16
2008	63	72	59	59	13
2010	60	68	58	58	10
2012	60	68	57	58	11
2014	64	70	61	64	9
2016	70	76	70	64	6
2018	74	79	73	71	6
January 2020	69	80	65	65	15
2021 Trilateral	66	70	65	65	5
2022	72	77	72	69	5
2023	64	63	66	62	-3
2024	63	67	61	63	6

Q40/6. Germany					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	69	73	66	68	8
2004	57	62	58	53	4
2006	57	64	57	54	7
2008	59	64	59	53	5
2010	50	59	46	48	13
2012	51	54	50	51	4

2014	57	62	53	57	9
2016	61	70	58	56	12
2018	60	66	60	57	6
2022	68	71	68	66	3
2023	61	67	63	55	4
2024	64	71	62	59	9

Q40/7. Turkey					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	58	64	55	57	9
2004	46	56	44	42	12
2006	46	51	42	48	9
2008	49	56	44	48	12
2010	42	49	40	40	9
2012	40	45	39	38	6
2014	43	47	40	43	7
2018	53	59	51	50	8
2022	56	65	55	51	10
2023	50	48	51	50	-3
2024	46	46	46	44	0

Q40/8. Australia					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2012	40	44	38	39	6
2014	42	44	38	43	6
2016	46	53	42	45	11
2021 Trilateral	54	56	49	56	7
2022	56	64	51	55	13
2023	49	52	49	48	3
2024	48	52	46	49	6

Q40/10. Poland					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	37	39	32	39	0
2018	47	55	44	46	0
2022	62	68	59	61	9
2023	54	53	54	54	-1
2024	53	54	53	55	1

Q40/15. NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia					
Should Have (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2022	65	67	67	61	0
2023	53	45	61	52	-16
2024	54	54	58	52	-4

Table 16. Support for Use of US Troops in Other Parts of the World

Q30. There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops:

Q30/1. If North Korea invaded South Korea					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1990	44	53	40	43	13
1994	39	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1998	30	33	28	33	5
2002	36	50	31	37	19
2004	43	49	43	39	6
2006	45	55	42	41	13
2008	41	51	32	45	19
2010	40	47	38	36	9
2012	41	51	40	36	11
2014	47	53	44	46	9
2015	47	53	50	42	3
2017	62	70	59	61	11
2018	64	70	63	61	7

2019	58	63	57	56	6
2020	58	57	58	58	-1
March 2021	53	57	51	53	6
2021	63	68	61	62	7
2022	55	54	58	53	-4
2023	50	46	57	48	-11
2024	51	52	54	49	-2

Q30/2. If China invaded Taiwan					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
1982	19	25	17	17	8
1986	19	22	18	18	4
1998	27	30	24	30	6
2002	31	39	24	32	14
2004	33	40	30	31	10
2006	32	39	31	29	8
2008	32	36	27	34	10
2010	25	34	21	21	13
2012	28	35	26	23	9
2013	23	26	19	25	7
2014	26	25	24	29	1
2015	28	28	29	28	1
2018	35	39	36	33	4
2019	38	42	38	35	4
2020	41	43	40	40	3
March 2021	42	47	37	42	10
July 2021	52	60	50	49	10
2022	44	44	46	42	-2
2024	43	45	44	40	1

Q30/3. To be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2002	65	63	73	60	-10
2004	52	49	55	50	-7
2006	51	45	55	53	-10
2008	51	47	60	48	-12

2010	49	47	56	46	-9
2012	50	51	55	45	-4
2014	50	46	59	42	-13
2019	59	61	64	52	-3
2024	54	48	62	51	-14

Q30/8. If Israel were attacked by its neighbors					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2010	47	60	41	42	19
2012	49	64	44	42	20
2014	45	52	41	44	11
2015	53	67	49	46	18
2018	53	69	45	50	24
2021	53	72	41	49	31
2024	41	55	35	35	20

Q30/8A. If Israel were attacked by Iran					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2024	42	53	34	42	21

Q30/14. If China initiates a military conflict with Japan over disputed Islands					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2015	33	32	33	33	-1
2017	40	45	35	41	10
2018	41	47	42	37	5
2019	43	48	40	41	8
March 2021	44	50	41	42	9
2023	43	45	45	41	0
2024	44	45	46	42	-1

Q30/13. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2014	44	50	41	43	9
2015	45	45	51	40	-6

2017	52	54	52	51	2
2018	54	52	61	50	-9
2019	54	56	56	51	0
2020	52	47	56	52	-9
March 2021	44	44	44	44	0
July 2021	59	57	63	58	-6
March 2022	56	48	62	58	-14
2023	57	48	68	55	-20
2024	54	50	62	50	-12

Q30/13G. If Russia invades a NATO ally like Germany					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2023	64	64	69	60	-5
2024	65	66	68	61	-2

Q30/21. To stop immigrants coming into the US from Mexico					
Favor (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2019	49	82	21	50	61
2023	47	79	23	44	56
2024	53	84	30	50	54

Part IV

Table 17. Value of International Trade

Q190. Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for:

Q190/1. The U.S. economy					
Good (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2004	57	59	55	57	4
2006	54	60	52	53	8
2016	59	51	68	56	17
2017	72	68	80	69	-12
2018	82	82	84	81	-2

2019	87	87	89	84	-2
2020	74	73	79	72	-6
2021	75	66	84	74	-18
2023	74	64	83	73	-19
2024	75	68	82	74	-14

Q190/3. Consumers like you					
Good (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2004	73	74	73	72	1
2006	70	78	68	69	10
2016	70	67	75	69	-8
2017	78	76	83	76	-7
2018	85	84	86	86	-2
2020	82	80	86	81	-6
2021	82	78	90	80	-12
2023	82	75	88	81	-13
2024	81	78	85	81	-7

Q190/4. Creating jobs in the US					
Good (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2004	38	37	38	39	-1
2006	37	38	38	36	0
2016	40	34	47	37	-13
2017	56	48	68	51	-20
2018	67	64	71	65	-7
2020	59	59	64	54	-5
2021	60	51	68	59	-17
2023	63	52	74	61	-22
2024	58	47	69	57	-22

Q190/7. Your own standard of living					
Good (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2004	65	66	63	65	3
2006	64	70	64	62	6
2016	64	60	72	60	12
2021	79	75	87	76	-12

2023	80	73	87	79	-14
2024	81	75	86	81	-11

Table 18. Priorities in US Trade Policy

QIBD2. Generally speaking, do you think US trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs, or have no restrictions to enable American consumers to have the most choices and the lowest prices?

QIBD2. Restrictions on Foreign Goods					
US trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2018	60	77	49	59	28
2023	66	79	61	62	18
2024	66	77	63	61	14
US trade policy should have no restrictions to enable American consumers to have the most choices and the lowest prices (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2018	38	21	49	40	28
2023	32	20	36	36	-16
2024	31	22	34	37	-12

Table 19. US-China Policy

Q353. Would you support or oppose the following U.S. policies towards China?

Q353/1. Increasing tariffs on products imported from China					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2020	55	76	39	57	37
2021	62	83	45	62	38
2024 Flash Poll 8	55	78	39	53	39

Q353/2. Limiting the number of Chinese students studying in the United States					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2019	40	57	28	38	29
2020	45	65	32	44	32
2021	46	72	32	41	40

2024 Flash Poll 8	46	65	32	44	33
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Q353/3. Significantly reduce trade between the US and China, even if this leads to greater costs for American consumers					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2020	54	70	41	55	29
2021 Trilateral	51	70	40	51	30
2021	57	77	44	56	33
2024 Flash Poll 8	45	63	35	44	28

Q353/4. Prohibiting US companies from selling sensitive high-tech products to China					
Support (%)					
	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent	R-D Gap
2020	74	85	67	74	18
2021 Trilateral	71	80	68	74	12
2024 Flash Poll 8	79	86	78	80	12

Methodology

This analysis is based on data from the 2024 Chicago Council Survey of the American public on foreign policy, an annual project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy. The 2024 Chicago Council Survey was conducted June 21–July 1, 2024, by Ipsos using its large-scale nationwide online research panel, KnowledgePanel, in English and Spanish among a weighted national sample of 2,106 adults 18 or older living in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. KnowledgePanel is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire U.S. population. Ipsos recruits panel members using address-based sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full coverage of all households in the nation.

The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 2.3 percentage points, including a design effect of 1.1229. The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups (± 4.2 points for Republicans, ± 3.9 points for Democrats, and ± 3.8 points for Independents) or for partial-sample items. Partisan identification is based on how respondents answered a standard partisan self-identification question: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”

The 2024 Chicago Council Survey was fielded to a total of 3,661 panel members yielding a total of 2,204 completed surveys (a completion rate of 60.2%). The median survey length was 25 minutes. Of the 2,204 total completed surveys, 98 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,106 respondents.

Cases were excluded if they failed one of the following three criteria:

1. **Speedsters:** Respondents who completed the survey in 8 minutes or less.
 - Total cases removed: n=55
2. **Refused 50% or more of questions:** Respondents who refused to answer 50% or more of the eligible survey questions.
 - Total cases removed: n=59; n=43 unique to criteria group
3. **Data Check Score of 3 of 4:** Respondents who failed 3 or 4 of the quality checks implemented (see criteria below).
 - Total cases removed: n=13; n=0 unique to criteria group

1. Completed survey faster than 8 minutes.

2. Did not accurately input a “4”, refused or skipped Question Q3_1 in the survey, which was designed to make sure respondents were paying attention to the survey. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the below list.”).
3. Refused one or more full battery of 5 attributes or more (Q2F, Q131, Q5, Q7, Q8, Q25, Q30, Q451S, Q40, Q491, Q44, Q86, Q325, Q257, QTW2, QVOTEISSUE).
4. Respondents who straight lined their responses to a battery of grid questions (Q131, Q44, Q325, QVOTEISSUE).

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Dina Smeltz, Vice President and Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (dsmeltz@globalaffairs.org) or Craig Kafura, Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (ckafura@globalaffairs.org).

Additional data comes from a joint Chicago Council-Ipsos survey conducted September 13-15, 2024 using the KnowledgePanel among a weighted national sample of 1,019 adults 18 or older living in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 3.6 percentage points, including a design effect of 1.40.

Results were weighted to adjust for gender by age, race/ethnicity, education, Census region, metropolitan status, and household income using demographic benchmarks from the 2023 March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Specific categories used were:

- Gender (Male, Female) by Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59 and 60+)
- Race/Hispanic Ethnicity (White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Other Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, 2+ Races Non-Hispanic)
- Education (Less than High School, High School, Some College, Bachelor’s Degree or Higher)
- Census Region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Metropolitan status (Metro, Non-Metro)
- Household Income (Under \$25,000, \$25,000-\$49,999, \$50,000-\$74,999, \$75,000-\$99,999, \$100,000-\$149,999, \$150,000+)

The 2024 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the Crown family, the Korea Foundation, and the United States-Japan Foundation.

Related Analysis

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[“Americans Prioritize Domestic Spending over Foreign Aid,”](#) Libby Berry, August 12, 2024.

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[“Americans’ Goals for US Foreign Policy,”](#) Craig Kafura, August 22, 2024.

[“American Support for Active US Global Role Not What It Used to Be,”](#) Dina Smeltz, August 22, 2024.

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[“Americans See Benefits of Trade, yet Support Restrictions to Protect US Jobs,”](#) Karl Friedhoff, August 22, 2024.

[“Americans See High Stakes for Western Security in Russia-Ukraine War,”](#) Dina Smeltz and Lama El Baz, August 22, 2024.

[“Americans See United States Playing Positive Role in Middle East,”](#) Dina Smeltz and Lama El Baz, August 29, 2024.

[“Americans Fear Recent Assassinations in Middle East Will Spark Wider War,”](#) Dina Smeltz and Lama El Baz, August 29, 2024.

[“Americans Largely Support Using US Troops to Defend Allies,”](#) Karl Friedhoff, September 23, 2024.

[“On Taiwan, Americans Favor the Status Quo,”](#) Craig Kafura, October 8, 2024.

[“Americans See Negative Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea,”](#) Karl Friedhoff, October 16, 2024.

[“Americans Say Weakening Democracy Is the Most Critical Threat to the US,”](#) Lama El Baz, October 21, 2024.

[“American Views of China Hit All-Time Low,”](#) Craig Kafura, October 24, 2024.