

Latinos Resemble Other Americans in Preferences for US Foreign Policy

Differences mainly concern immigration, climate change,
and confidence in the United Nations

Dina S. Smeltz and Craig Kafura

Hispanic Americans are driving an historic shift in US demographics. As the Latino population grows in size and political strength, its political leadership is likely to hold greater sway over US domestic and foreign policy. For this reason, The Chicago Council decided to investigate how Latino foreign policy views compare to those of other Americans as part of the annual 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion on US foreign policy. The survey reveals that Latinos share a very similar worldview with the larger US public.

- ▶ Like the overall US public, Latinos favor strong US leadership in the world and consider the United States to be the most influential nation now and in 10 years' time.
- ▶ Hispanics and other Americans consider terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Iran's nuclear program, and cyber attacks to be critical threats to US vital interests.
- ▶ Both groups support a foreign policy that relies on multiple means of diplomatic and economic engagement, including alliances, treaties, and trade agreements.
- ▶ Majorities of both groups support the use of US troops to help prevent a government from committing genocide, to deal with humanitarian crises, to

ensure the oil supply, to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and to combat terrorism.

- ▶ At the time of this survey, conducted before the Obama administration announced the renewal of ties with Cuba, both Hispanics and non-Hispanics were equally likely to favor dialogue with Cuba as well as with North Korea and Iran.

Despite these similarities, there are some key differences, especially on the topics of immigration, climate change, and the United Nations.

- ▶ Latinos are less threatened than non-Latinos by the prospect of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States. They are less likely to prioritize controlling and reducing illegal immigration as a top foreign policy goal.
- ▶ A majority of Hispanics, compared to only one-third of non-Hispanics, consider climate change to be a "critical" threat.
- ▶ A majority of Hispanics, compared to roughly four in ten non-Hispanics, think combating world hunger should be a "very important" goal of US foreign policy.
- ▶ At least six in ten Latinos say that the UN is doing a good job in a variety of areas, while many fewer non-Latinos say the same in every case.

Latinos are growing in influence.

Hispanic Americans will account for most of the nation's population growth through 2050. Asian Americans, while a far smaller proportion of the overall population, are growing at a slightly faster rate. According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, nearly 30 percent of Americans will be Hispanic by this time.¹ This trend has taken on even more political significance since the 2012 presidential election, which highlighted the electoral influence of Hispanic Americans.

As the Latino population grows in size and political strength, its political leadership is likely to exert greater influence on issues of particular importance to the Hispanic community. The Pew Research Center, the Public Religion Research Institute, and other organizations have issued several reports on Hispanic public opinion on US domestic policy issues such

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as immigration, religion, and voting preferences. But there have not been many studies of Hispanic American preferences on US foreign policy aside from immigration. For this reason, The Chicago Council included a special oversample of Hispanic Americans in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion on US foreign policy to investigate how Latino foreign policy views compare to those of other Americans.

A recurring argument among Americans concerned about the large number of Latino immigrants coming to the United States has been that they will not share the same values—foreign policy or otherwise—as other Americans. But the 2014 Chicago Council Survey finds that Hispanic Americans share a very similar worldview and foreign policy preferences with the larger US public.

Nevertheless, some differences in policy preferences are apparent. When it comes to international issues, Latino politicians and interest groups are best

1. Throughout this report, Hispanic and Latino are used interchangeably.


known for their focus on immigration reform (and to a limited extent, Cuba policy). If the Chicago Council Survey is any indication, future influence may also include calls for greater attention to environmental and humanitarian issues.

Hispanic Americans favor strong US leadership in the world.

Like the overall US public, Latinos favor strong US leadership in the world (77% Latinos, 84% non-Latinos) (figure 1). Latinos similarly consider the United States to be the most influential country in the world, rating it an average of 8.3 out of 10 on a scale of influence, with 10 being the highest possible level of influence (non-Latinos give the United States the same average rating of 8.3). In addition, two-thirds of both Hispanics and other Americans say the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world (65%).

While both Hispanics and non-Hispanics say that US influence will decline over the next 10 years, Hispanics are slightly more optimistic about US influence in the future, rating it an average of 8.0 out of 10 (7.8 among non-Hispanics). China's influence comes in second to the United States among both Hispanics and non-Hispanics, with Hispanics giving China an average of 6.4 today (7.2 among non-Hispanics) and an average of 6.8 in 10 years (7.3 among non-Hispanics).

FIGURE 1



Canada and Mexico top the list of favored nations among Latinos.

Hispanic Americans are fairly similar to the rest of the US public in terms of feelings toward other countries. At the extremes, both Hispanics and other Americans express the fondest regard for Canada, and coolest feelings toward North Korea. Given the large proportion of Hispanic Americans of Mexican descent (see the Methodology section for details of the sample), it is not surprising that Hispanic Americans are more positive than other Americans toward Mexico. On the scale of “feelings” from 0 to 100, with 100 being the warmest and 50 being neutral, Latinos give Mexico an average rating of 67, compared to an average of 51 among non-Latinos. Latinos also give slightly higher ratings than other Americans to other Latin American countries, including Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba (figure 2).

More Latinos are concerned about climate change, fewer about immigrants coming into the United States.

For the most part, Latinos and the rest of the US public view the top threats facing the United States similarly. Though the final rank of the threats differs, majorities of about six in ten or more Latinos and non-Latinos view the same four threats as “critical”: international terrorism (67% Latinos, 62% non-Latinos), Iran’s nuclear program (64% Latinos, 57% non-Latinos), cyber attacks on US computer networks (60% Latinos, 71% non-Latinos), and the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (56% Latinos, 61% non-Latinos) (figures 3 and 4).

Strikingly, however, a majority of Hispanic Americans consider climate change to be a critical threat to US vital interests (54%), compared to only 32 percent of non-Hispanics. In addition, slightly more Hispanics (54%) than non-Hispanics (49%) say the US government is not doing enough on climate change. And Hispanics (55%) are more likely than non-Hispanics (41%) to favor expanding the federal budget for environmental protection. In part, this emphasis on climate change is related to the relatively younger composition of the Latino population compared to the US population as a whole. Younger Americans are more likely than older Americans to view climate change as a critical threat. However, analysis shows that age is not the only factor—being Latino also has a unique influence on views of climate change.

FIGURE 2





FIGURE 3

Threats to US Vital Interests (Latino)

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (%)

■ Not important ■ Important but not critical ■ Critical




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FIGURE 4

Threats to US Vital Interests (Non-Latino)

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (%)

■ Not important ■ Important but not critical ■ Critical



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
Another clear difference emerges on immigration. Given that half of all adult Hispanics were born in another country according to the Pew Hispanic Center,² it is perhaps not surprising that Latinos are far less likely than non-Latinos to consider “large numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the United States” a critical threat (22% Latinos vs. 42% of non-Latinos).

2. Pew Hispanic Center, “Hispanic Nativity Shift,” 29 April 2014.

More Latinos consider combating world hunger and limiting climate change important goals.

The overall similarities on threat perceptions—as well as certain unique differences—are also apparent on the importance of US foreign policy goals (figures 5 and 6). Like other Americans, majorities of Latinos say that protecting American jobs (79% vs. 76% non-Latinos), preventing the spread of nuclear

FIGURE 5




weapons (68% vs. 73% of non-Latinos), combating international terrorism (65% vs. 61% of non-Latinos), securing adequate supplies of energy (62% vs. 67% of non-Latinos), and reducing US dependence on foreign oil (60% vs. 77% of non-Latinos) are “very important” goals.

Latinos, however, place a greater priority than others on combating world hunger (56% vs. 39% of non-Latinos) and limiting climate change (47% vs. 40%

non-Latinos). By contrast, non-Latinos place greater priority on maintaining superior military power worldwide (54% vs. 45% of Latinos) and “controlling and reducing illegal immigration” (50% vs. 34% Latinos).

Among Latinos and non-Latinos alike, the goals of defending allies’ security, promoting and defending human rights in other countries, and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations fall at the bottom of the ranking.

FIGURE 6



Immigration reform is a continuing goal for the Hispanic community.

Results from a 2013 Chicago Council Survey found that eight in ten Hispanics (79%) and two-thirds of non-Hispanics (66%) think that illegal immigrants currently working in the United States should be allowed to stay in their jobs, either with a path to citizenship (51% Hispanics, 52% non-Hispanics) or with a work permit alone (28% Hispanics; 14% non-Hispanics).³ Beneath this shared support, however, there are some clear differences in Latino and non-Latino views on immigration, especially on the president's November

Majorities of both Hispanics and non-Hispanics support a legal path for undocumented immigrants to stay in the country.

2014 executive action on immigration. That executive action, which dramatically expanded the population of undocumented immigrants eligible for deferred action and employment authorization, is far more popular among Hispanics than non-Hispanics. A December 2014 Pew Research Center survey found that among Hispanics, eight in ten (81%) approve of executive action, with six in ten (59%) strongly approving. But among non-Hispanics, only four in ten (41%) approve, and half (49%) say they strongly disapprove.⁴

In addition, the 2012 Chicago Council Survey found that a plurality of both Hispanics and non-Hispanics (42% each) said that legal immigration should be kept at its present level. But among the rest, Hispanics were more likely to say that legal immigration into the United States should be increased (31% vs. 16% of non-Hispanics) and less likely to support decreases (25% vs. 40% of non-Hispanics).⁵ In the 2010 Chicago Council Survey, Hispanics were substantially more likely than non-Hispanics to say that immigration is good for their community, their standard of living, job security for American workers, creating jobs in the

3. Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, "American Views toward Mexico," The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April 29, 2013.

4. Pew Research Center, "Immigration Action Gets Mixed Response, But Legal Pathway Still Popular," December 11, 2014. Non-Hispanic results noted here are calculated from the available Pew cross tabulations.


5. Smeltz, "Foreign Policy in the New Millennium."

United States, American companies, the US economy, and the country as a whole.⁶

Latinos support multiple approaches to engagement

Like the rest of the US public, Latinos see multiple approaches to international engagement as having been effective (figure 7). Eight in ten or more say that

FIGURE 7




6. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "Global Views 2010." For an overall view of Chicago Council Survey results on immigration, see "Holding Steady: Public Opinion on Immigration" by Dina Smeltz, Sara McElmurry, and Craig Kafura, October 28, 2014.

FIGURE 8

Support for Talks with Leaders of Unfriendly Countries and Groups

As you may know there is currently a debate about whether US government leaders should be ready to meet and talk with leaders of countries and groups with whom the US has hostile or unfriendly relations. Do you think US leaders should or should not be ready to meet and talk with leaders of... (% should be ready)



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maintaining military superiority, maintaining existing alliances, and building new alliances have been effective ways of achieving US foreign policy goals. At least seven in ten of both groups say trade agreements have been effective, though larger majorities of Latinos than non-Latinos think the strategic use of sanctions has been effective.

In terms of dialogue with countries unfriendly toward the United States (Cuba, Iran, North Korea), Hispanic views are fairly similar to the views of other Americans. While this survey was fielded before the Obama administration’s announcement to reopen ties with Cuba, seven in ten Hispanics and non-Hispanics support US leaders meeting and talking with Cuban officials (figure 8).⁷ Both groups favor dialogue with

7. The subsample of Cuban-Americans in the Chicago Council Survey is too small to analyze with statistical significance (n=21). These results merely suggest that Cuban-Americans are at least as likely as the public overall to support talking with leaders in Cuba. Moreover, another poll conducted by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University shows that even in heavily Cuban

North Korea and Iran and favor the interim agreement with Iran that eases some of the economic sanctions in exchange for the acceptance of some restrictions on its nuclear program (68% Latinos, 61% non-Latinos).

Majorities of Latinos—compared to half of non-Latinos—say that US government leaders should be ready to meet and talk with leaders of the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

More Latinos than non-Latinos, however, are open to dialogue with certain groups hostile to the United States. Majorities of Latinos—compared to half of non-Latinos—say that US government leaders should be ready to meet and talk with leaders of the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

More Latinos are impressed with the UN’s performance than non-Latinos.

Compared to other Americans, larger majorities of Latinos think strengthening the United Nations (79% Latinos, 62% non-Latinos) has been an effective way to achieve US foreign policy goals (figure 7). Latinos are also somewhat more likely to say that strengthening the United Nations is a “very important” foreign policy goal (48% vs. 35% of non-Latinos) (figures 5 and 6). In addition, Hispanics are slightly more likely than other Americans to agree that “when dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice” (64% vs. 58% of non-Latinos).


Majorities of both Latinos and non-Latinos tend to praise UN efforts on protecting the cultural heritage of the world, sending peacekeeping missions to conflict zones, leading international efforts to combat hunger, and protecting and supporting refugees around the world. In fact, at least six in ten Latinos say that the UN is doing a very or somewhat good job on every dimension asked about in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, including authorizing the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security (66%), impos-

areas of Florida, Cuban Americans favor re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba and lifting travel restrictions.

FIGURE 9

Performance of the United Nations

Do you think the United Nations is doing a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad job at the following... (% very and somewhat good combined)



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ing sanctions on countries that violate international law (65%), resolving international conflicts through negotiations (66%), and preventing nuclear proliferation (64%). On these four specific items, non-Latinos are divided on whether the UN is doing a good or poor job (figure 9).

Latinos resemble other Americans on when to use force.

Majorities of Latinos and non-Latinos support the use of US troops to deal with humanitarian crises (77% Latinos, 70% non-Latinos) and to help prevent a government from committing genocide (70% Latinos, 71% non-Latinos). Nearly identical percentages of Latinos and non-Latinos support the use of US troops


to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons (68% Latinos, 69% non-Latinos) and to ensure the oil supply (55% Latinos, 54% non-Latinos). More Hispanic Americans than others are open to committing troops to a peacekeeping mission in Syria (54% Latino, 43% non-Latino) (figure 10).

In parallel with the overall public, majorities of Latinos tend to oppose using force if Israel bombs Iran's nuclear facilities and Iran were to retaliate (45% Latino, 43% non-Latino), if Israel were attacked by its neighbors (40% Latino, 46% non-Latino), if North Korea invaded South Korea (40% Latino, 49% non-Latino), if Russia invaded a Baltic NATO ally (29% Latino, 46% non-Latino) or the rest of Ukraine (26% Latino, 31% non-Latino), or if China invaded Taiwan (24% Latino, 27% non-Latino).

FIGURE 10

Support for Use of US Troops

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)




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FIGURE 11

Support for Measures to Combat Terrorism

In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures... (% favor)



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When it comes to combating terrorism, Latinos, like other Americans, favor the use of force. But they are less likely than other Americans to support the use of drones in particular, and to a lesser extent, targeted assassinations and air strikes. Only half of Latinos favor the use of drone strikes against suspected terror-

Latinos are less likely than other Americans to support the use of drones and, to a lesser extent, targeted assassinations and air strikes to combat terrorism.

ists, compared to two-thirds of non-Latinos. And six in ten Latinos versus seven in ten non-Latinos favor US air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities and assassinations of individual terrorist leaders. Equal proportions of both groups favor the use of ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities (figure 11).

Views are similar on greater Mideast security policy.


On overarching security policies, Latinos and non-Latinos are in general agreement. Both groups express war weariness: seven in ten Hispanic and non-Hispanic Americans say that the war in Afghanistan (70% Latinos, 72% non-Latinos) and the war in Iraq (70% Latinos, 72% non-Latinos) were not worth the costs. But a majority of both groups believe the US military presence in the Middle East increases stability in the region (55% Latinos vs. 56% non-Latinos). In fact, Hispanics tend to be somewhat more supportive than other Americans of the United States having long-term bases in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. They are, however, less supportive of bases in Turkey (figure 12).

On Syria, eight in ten Latinos and non-Latinos oppose sending troops (77% Latinos, 79% non-Latinos), and about half support enforcing a no-fly zone

FIGURE 12


Support for Long-Term US Military Bases in Countries

Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)



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FIGURE 13



over Syria, including bombing Syrian air defenses (45% Latinos, 49% non-Latinos). As far as the Israel-Palestinian conflict is concerned, an even larger majority of Latinos than non-Latinos says the United States should not take either side (71% Latinos, 62% non-Latinos).

Latinos align with other Americans on support for the rebalance to Asia.


Latinos believe the US military presence in East Asia increases stability in the region, reflecting overall US public opinion. Six in ten Latinos and non-Latinos also support the US government’s plans to “pivot” diplomatic and military resources away from the Middle East and Europe and more toward Asia (60%

Six in ten Latinos support US plans to “pivot” diplomatic and military resources toward Asia.

Latino, 61% non-Latino). Six in ten of both groups believe the United States should put a higher priority on “building up our strong relations with traditional allies like South Korea and Japan, even if this might diminish our relationship with China” (60% Latinos, 59% non-Latinos) (figure 13).

At the same time, six in ten Latinos and seven in ten non-Latinos favor friendly cooperation and engagement with China over a containment strategy (figure 14). Hispanics are more likely than non-Hispanics to say that the United States and China are mostly partners (57% vs. 47% non-Hispanics) rather than mostly rivals (41% vs. 49% non-Hispanics).

FIGURE 14



On specific bases in Asia, majorities of Latinos support long-term military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, though less enthusiastically than non-Latinos in the latter two cases (figure 12). Majorities of both Hispanics and other Americans sense tensions between Japan and China: 66 percent of Hispanics and 73 percent of non-Hispanics say the two countries are rivals rather than partners.

Latinos support globalization and free trade.

Like a majority of Americans, Latinos say globalization is mostly good (68% vs. 64% non-Latinos) and believe that economic strength is more important than military strength in determining a country’s overall power and influence (83% vs. 76% of non-Latinos). Latinos are even more likely than non-Latinos to favor major free trade agreements being negotiated by the Unit-


ed States. Seven in ten favor the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Pacific nations, compared to six in ten non-Latinos (71% vs. 61% of non-Latinos). A similar proportion of Latinos favor the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union (70% vs. 61% of non-Latinos). Additionally, a 2013 Chicago Council Survey found that Latinos were more likely than non-Latinos to see NAFTA as good for US consumers, American companies, and the US economy. On the larger issue of trade agreements that lower trade tariffs, Latinos are more likely than non-Latinos

to favor agreements that offer relief programs for those who lose their jobs (58% vs. 49% of non-Latinos).

Budget preferences reflect greater emphasis on social programs.

More Latinos than other Americans express a desire to expand the federal budget for social programs. These include health care, Social Security, education, environmental protection and, to a lesser extent, welfare and unemployment programs (figure 15).

FIGURE 15



Summary and conclusion

The 2014 Chicago Council Survey reveals that Hispanic Americans share a broadly similar worldview with their fellow Americans. Both Hispanics and non-Hispanics support strong American leadership in the world. Both have similar perceptions of top threats and support similar foreign policy goals for the United States. And Americans—Hispanic and non-Hispanic alike—share similar attitudes about the use of US military force abroad.

- ▶ At the time of this survey, which was conducted before the Obama administration announced the renewal of ties with Cuba, both Hispanics and non-Hispanics were equally likely to favor dialogue with Cuba as well as North Korea and Iran.
- ▶ Hispanics and other Americans consider terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the Iran nuclear program, and cyber attacks to be critical threats to US vital interests.
- ▶ Majorities of both groups support the use of US troops to help prevent a government from committing genocide, to deal with humanitarian crises, to ensure the oil supply, to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and to combat terrorism.

Despite these broad similarities, there are important differences of opinion between Latinos and other Americans on certain topics.

- ▶ A majority of Hispanics (54%) versus one-third of non-Hispanics (32%) consider climate change a critical threat. Latinos also place a greater priority than other Americans on combating world hunger (56% vs. 39% non-Latinos).
- ▶ Latinos are more likely than other Americans to express confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations, especially when it comes to authorizing military force to maintain or restore international peace and security, imposing sanctions on countries that violate international law, resolving international conflicts through negotiations, and preventing nuclear proliferation.

Some of these divergences are expected. Among a population as tied to recent immigration as American Hispanics, a greater acceptance of immigration makes

perfect sense. Latinos' greater concern about climate change may stem partly from their relatively younger demographics and/or more immediate experiences with natural disasters. Their greater confidence in the United Nations may be partly explained by an enhanced appreciation for and familiarity with multilateral organizations such as the Organization of American States as well as the United Nations.

In the longer term, Hispanic voters may call for a greater emphasis on environmental and humanitarian issues as well as stronger support for the United Nations.

When it comes to issues with an international component, Latino politicians and interest groups are best known for their focus on immigration reform as well as US policy towards Cuba (though to lesser extent). In addition to these two areas, the findings of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey suggest that in the longer term, Hispanic voters may also call for a greater emphasis on environmental and humanitarian issues and coordinating international efforts in a multilateral context.

Acknowledgments

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About the Chicago Council Survey

The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since 2002, and now annually, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal data on American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and international issues. With its combination of time series and comprehensive coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers, academics, media, and the general public because of its unique ability to capture the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam, post-Cold war, post-9/11—and to define critical shifts in American public thinking.

The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the United States and abroad. Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council survey data, including *The Foreign Policy Gap* (Page, Bouton), *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Holsti), *Faces of Internationalism* (Wittkopf), and *The Rational Public* (Page and Shapiro). All of the Chicago

Council Survey data sets are available to the public via the Roper Center and ICPSR and will be available soon on www.thechicagocouncil.org. In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and US foreign policy, the Chicago Council's polling has often expanded to international polling in Europe, Asia, and Mexico. Recently the Council has reintroduced a leaders' survey as an important component of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey (report forthcoming). The Council has also conducted in-depth analyses of Midwestern public and business views of immigration reform.

Besides these comprehensive reports, the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on topical issues such as negotiations with Iran, climate change, energy, and the pivot to Asia. These short reports can be found on the Council's website and on the Chicago Council survey blog www.RunningNumbers.org.

About the authors

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Dina Smeltz is a senior fellow for public opinion and foreign policy at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, with over 20 years experience in designing and analyzing international social and political surveys. She was formerly the division chief of research in the Middle East and South Asia division (2001-2007) and chief/analyst of the European division (1992-2004) in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department's Office of Opinion Research. In this capacity, Dina analyzed over 100 surveys in these regions and regularly briefed senior government officials on key research findings. She currently directs all survey work conducted by The Chicago Council, including the annual Chicago Council Survey.

Craig Kafura

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Demographic information on the Hispanic sample

The Hispanic/Latino sample in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey is drawn from respondents who describe their ethnicity as Hispanic in either of the two demographic questions in the survey (see the Methodology section for specifics on how Hispanic respondents are identified). This section outlines some of the demographic characteristics of this sample.

The Latino respondents are predominantly of Mexican origin (62%). This reflects the overall Hispanic population's national origins. According to the most recently available American Community Survey data (2013), 64 percent of Hispanics identify as being of Mexican origin (table 1).⁸

Another distinguishing characteristic of the Hispanic population of the United States is its youth. Nearly two-thirds of the Hispanic population is under the age of 44, and three in ten are under 30. The 2014 Chicago Council Survey's sampling of the Hispanic population reflects this youthfulness, with similar proportions to the overall US Hispanic population (table 2).

Additionally, the Hispanic population of the United States is very slightly more male (50.8%) than female (49.2%). This, too, is reflected in the sample for the 2014 Chicago Council Survey (table 3).

8. US Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2013, one-year estimates.

TABLE 1

Country of Origin (% of Latino Sample)		
	2014 Chicago Council Survey	2013 American Community Survey
Mexican	62	64
Puerto Rican	9	10
Cuban	4	4
Central American	4	9
South American	6	6
Caribbean	2	3
Other	12	5

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TABLE 2

Age (% of Latino Sample)		
	2014 Chicago Council Survey	2013 American Community Survey
18-29	30	29
30-44	34	34
45-64	27	27
65+	9	10

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TABLE 3

Gender (% of Latino Sample)		
	2014 Chicago Council Survey	2013 American Community Survey
Male	51	51
Female	49	49


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TABLE 4

Education (% of Latino Sample Age 25 and Over)		
	2014 Chicago Council Survey	2013 American Community Survey
Less than 9th grade	12	21
9th to 12th grade, no diploma	23	14
High school graduate (diploma, GED, or alternative)	29	27
Some college, no degree	16	18
Associate's degree	6	6
Bachelor's degree	8	10
Graduate or professional degree	6	4

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FIGURE 16




Finally, the Hispanic population in the United States is less educated than the overall population, with more than six in ten possessing no more than a high school education. This, too, is reflected in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey data, though with slightly different distributions of sub-high-school educational levels (table 4). Despite these demographic differences, data analysis reveals that the distinctiveness of Hispanics' views on climate change, immigration, and the United Nations are not attributable to these differences alone.

In terms of political participation, Latinos are considerably less likely to vote than other Americans. In 2012 only 48 percent of the eligible Hispanic electorate voted, compared to 66 percent of blacks, 64 percent of whites, and 47 percent of Asians.⁹ However, when they do vote, they tend to cast their ballots for Democratic candidates. Indeed, President Obama's victory in 2012 was aided by a near-record share of the Hispanic vote (71%). And going back to 1980, a majority of Hispanics have consistently voted for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections, in proportions ranging from a low of 58 percent in 2004 to a high of 72 percent in 1996.¹⁰

9. Thom File, "The Diversifying Electorate—Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2012 (and Other Recent Elections)," US Census Bureau, May 2013; William H. Frey, "Minority Turnout Determined the 2012 Election," Brookings Institution, May 10, 2013.

10. Pew Hispanic Center, "Latino Voters in the 2012 Election," November 7, 2012.

FIGURE 17



Amplifying this political impact is the growing size of the Hispanic electorate. In 2012 Hispanics made up nearly 11 percent of the voting population, an increase from 9.5 percent in 2008 and 8.1 percent in 2004.¹¹

In this sample, Latinos are just slightly more likely than non-Latinos to identify as Democrats (42% to 36% non-Latinos; within the margin of error), and are less likely to identify as Republicans (19% to 29% of non-Latinos) (figure 16). When Latinos who identify as Independents are probed further, 23 percent say they lean Democrat, and 14 percent say they lean Republican. The remaining 64 percent say they do not lean one way or the other. Among non-Latinos, 25 percent of self-described Independents say they lean Democratic, with 34 percent saying they lean Republican and 40 percent saying they do not lean either way.

In terms of broader ideology, Latinos and non-Latinos are about equally likely to describe themselves as moderates. Among the rest, Latinos are more likely to place themselves on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum. One in three Latinos (35%) say they are liberal, while only one in four non-Latinos (26%) say the same. Non-Latinos are more likely to identify themselves as conservative (37% vs. 27% of Latinos) (figure 17).

11. File, "The Diversifying Electorate"; Frey, "Minority Turnout."

Methodology

This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The 2014 edition of the survey is the latest effort in a series of wide-ranging biennial surveys on American attitudes towards US foreign policy. The survey was conducted May 6-29, 2014, among a representative national sample of 2,108 adults, including an oversample of 311 Hispanic respondents for a total of 498 Hispanic respondents. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 2.5 , including a design effect of 1.46. For the Hispanic sample, the margin of error is ± 5.3 , including the design effect. When making comparisons between results for the Hispanic and non-Hispanic groups, the required difference for statistical significance is 6.1 percentage points.

The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California. The survey was fielded to a total of 3,905 panel members, including 759 in the Hispanic oversample, yielding a total of 2,243 completed surveys. Of the total completes, 1,914 were from the main sample (a completion rate of 61%) and 339 were from the Hispanic oversample (a completion rate of 45%). The median survey length was 37 minutes.

Of the 2,243 total completed surveys, 142 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,108 respondents. Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

1. Respondents who completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
2. Respondents who refused to answer half of the items in the survey or more.
3. Respondents who met three or four of the following criteria:
 - a. Completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
 - b. Did not accurately input “4,” refused, or skipped the question that was specifically designed to make sure respondents were paying attention. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the list below.”)
 - c. Refused one or more full lists that included five items or more (of which there were 22 such lists).
 - d. Gave exactly the same answer (“straight-lined”) to every item on one of the four longest lists in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q50 or Q55).

To account for the prevalence of Spanish among the Hispanic population, the survey was fielded in both English and Spanish. Hispanic respondents were given the option of taking the survey in either language; 187 respondents in the final sample chose to take the survey in Spanish. This bilingual fielding is necessary to produce more accurate samples of Hispanic opinion, as Spanish-dominant Hispanics differ from English-dominant Hispanics. Research by the Pew Hispanic Center has shown that Spanish-language dominance is the norm among foreign-born or first-generation Hispanics.¹² Second-generation and onward Hispanics are overwhelmingly (90%+) proficient in English, and either bilingual or English-dominant.

The survey was fielded using a randomly selected sample of GfK’s large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel®. Prior to April 2009, the panel was recruited using stratified random digit dialing (RDD) telephone sampling, and now uses address-based sampling (ABS) to cover the growing number of cell-phone-only households (approximately 97% of households are covered this way). Currently, 40 percent of panel members were recruited through RDD, 60 percent with ABS.

For both RDD and ABS recruitment, households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Internet hardware and access (if necessary), which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have Internet access.

12. Pew Hispanic Center, “When Labels Don’t Fit: Hispanics and Their Views of Identity,” April 4, 2012, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/when-labels-dont-fit-hispanics-and-their-views-of-identity/>.

Latino sampling

The sample for KnowledgePanel Latino is recruited using a hybrid telephone recruitment design, based on a dual-frame RDD methodology sampling US Latinos and households with Hispanic surnames. This geographically balanced sample covers areas that, when aggregated, encompass approximately 93 percent of the nation's 45.5 million Latinos.

KnowledgePanel Latino samples Latinos residing in 70 DMAs (Designated Market Area) having Latino populations, an approach dedicated to recruiting Spanish-language dominant adults. The 70 DMAs are grouped into five regions (Northeast, West, Midwest, Southeast, and Southwest). Each region is further divided into two groupings of census tracts: those with a “high-density” Latino population and the remaining tracts with a “low-density” Latino population. The threshold percentage for “high density” varies by region. The five regions, each divided into the two density groups, constitute 10 unique sample frames (5 x 2).

Using a geographic targeting approach, an RDD landline sample was generated to cover the high-density census tracts within each region. Due to the inaccuracy of telephone exchange coverage, there is always some spillage outside these tracts and a smaller degree of noncoverage within these tracts. About 32 percent of the Latino population across these five regions is covered theoretically by this targeted RDD landline sample. All the numbers generated were screened to locate a Latino, Spanish-speaking household.

The remaining 68 percent of the Latinos in these five regions were identified through a listed-surname sample. Listed surnames included only those households where the telephone subscriber had a surname that was preidentified as likely to be a Latino surname. It is important to note that excluded from this low-density listed sample frame are: (a) the mixed Latino/non-Latino households where the subscriber does not have a Latino surname and (b) all the unlisted landline Latino households. The percent of listed vs. unlisted varies at the DMA level. The use of the listed surname was intended to utilize cost-effective screening to locate Latino households in these low-density areas since the rate of finding Latino households on this list, although not with 100 percent certainty, was still very high.

This sampling design helps to reduce a potential problem with surveys of Hispanics: non-identification.

Past research by the Pew Hispanic Center has shown that not all Americans of Hispanic descent self-identify as Hispanic or Latino, with many instead identifying by their familial country of origin.¹³ Additionally, respondents are not necessarily consistent across surveys when categorizing themselves by race and ethnicity. In analyses of the 2000 and 2010 Census data, researchers found that some 2.7 million Hispanics changed their racial identification from “some other race” to white, and 1.3 million changed their identification from white to “some other race.”¹⁴

Weighting

The distribution of the sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the US population 18 years of age or older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, and education. To reduce the effects of any nonresponse and noncoverage bias in panel estimates, a poststratification raking adjustment is applied using demographic distributions from the most recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The poststratification weighting variables include age, gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and education. This weighting adjustment is applied prior to the selection of any sample from the KnowledgePanel and represents the starting weights for any sample. The following benchmark distributions were utilized for the poststratification weighting adjustment:

- ▶ Gender (male, female)
- ▶ Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60-plus)
- ▶ Race (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, 2+ races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- ▶ Education (less than high school, high school, some college, college degree or more)
- ▶ Household income (less than \$10K, \$10-25K, \$25-50K, \$50-75K, \$75-100K, \$100K-plus)
- ▶ Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- ▶ Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)

13. Ibid.

14. D’Vera Cohn, “Millions of Americans changed their racial or ethnic identity from one census to the next,” <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/05/millions-of-americans-changed-their-racial-or-ethnic-identity-from-one-census-to-the-next/>.

- ▶ Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- ▶ Internet access (yes, no)
- ▶ Primary language by Census region (non-Hispanic, Hispanic English proficient, Hispanic bilingual, Hispanic Spanish proficient)

Comparable distributions are calculated using all valid completed cases from the field data. Since study sample sizes are typically too small to accommodate a complete cross-tabulation of all the survey variables with the benchmark variables, an iterative proportional fitting is used for the poststratification weighting adjustment. This procedure adjusts the sample back

to the selected benchmark proportions. Through an iterative convergence process, the weighted sample data are optimally fitted to the marginal distributions. After this final poststratification adjustment, the distribution of calculated weights is examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The post-stratified trimmed weights are then scaled to the sum of the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at <http://www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/>.

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