



# Glasnost for US Intelligence: Will Transparency Lead to Increased Public Trust?

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A polling project launched last summer by the University of Texas aims to shed light on Americans' perception of intelligence agencies, and to test the claim that efforts by these agencies to be more open will enhance their democratic legitimacy.<sup>1</sup> While Americans generally consider the work of the intelligence community (IC) effective, few understand the institutional framework for supervising and overseeing this part of our government – despite more than a decade of vigorous public debate over controversial intelligence programs.

## Key takeaways:

- Americans generally regard the intelligence community as effective, particularly in preventing terrorism and learning the plans of hostile powers.
- Americans are less convinced the intelligence community is respectful of privacy and civil liberties.
- Less informed Americans, particularly younger people, were less likely to view the intelligence community as effective.
- Americans broadly were supportive of the intelligence community using all lawful means to acquire intelligence, but were divided on the need for surrendering privacy rights.
- Republicans were even more likely than Democrats or Independents to say the intelligence community helps the country produce sound foreign policies.
- Though less than a majority, Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to support protecting the privacy rights of foreigners.

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<sup>1</sup>From May to June 2017, the Texas National Security Network fielded a nationally representative survey with the survey market research firm YouGov. YouGov interviewed 1,251 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 1,000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). The margin of error is 4.1 percent. Data analysis is with survey weights. Joshua Busby, Jonathan Monten, Jordan Tama, and Craig Kafura, "[2017 Survey of the Mass Public, May 22 to June 10, 2017](#)" by YouGov on behalf of the Texas National Security Network.

## A Crisis of Public Confidence

In the wake of former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden's 2013 leaks of electronic surveillance and other classified programs, US Intelligence faced the immediate challenges of assessing the damage and salvaging critical counterterrorism capabilities. These tactical problems were soon overshadowed by a burgeoning public debate over the legality, efficacy, and oversight of the compromised programs. Questions were raised not only about the leaked programs, but also the democratic legitimacy of a post-9/11 intelligence community (IC) swollen by large infusions of money and personnel and extraordinary grants of authority.

The career security professionals leading US Intelligence in those days were genuinely surprised by the direction, intensity, and rancorous tone of that debate. Ideologically driven media outlets sustained high levels of public interest in these issues by skillfully parceling and sensationalizing new disclosures. More established journalists and private advocacy groups challenged the longstanding principles that guided how America's secret intelligence agencies were supervised and overseen.

President Barack Obama was slow and perceptibly measured in his public defense of the IC.<sup>2</sup> Members of Congress, some of whom had been briefed on the NSA programs and others who had not, were split in their reactions to the disclosures. Several prominent legislators acknowledged that they knew about and supported these programs; other members joined in the public criticism.

The so-called "grand bargain"<sup>3</sup> reached in the late 1970s between the executive and legislative branches following congressional investigations into Cold War intelligence excesses failed in this instance to confer on the US IC the presumption of legitimacy that its leaders expected. That arrangement required IC agencies, *inter alia*, to inform designated congressional committees of their secret activities and scrupulously follow new laws that regulated the monitoring of electronic communications. In return, Congress permitted the executive branch to retain broad discretion in directing the daily work of the intelligence agencies.

Under pressure in 2013, neither the president nor the Congress acted decisively to reassure the American public about the role being played by the IC. Intelligence leaders were, therefore, pressed into unfamiliar (and noticeably uncomfortable) service explaining to the public that the programs they were learning about were: properly authorized, lawful, subject to congressional scrutiny, respectful of Americans' privacy rights and, most important, effective in keeping the country safe. Their sincere efforts to manage an escalating crisis in public confidence did not prevent inaccurate facts and dubious conclusions from calcifying as conventional wisdom for many Americans.

## The Transparency Initiative

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<sup>2</sup> [Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence](#), January 17, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> See Jack Goldsmith's *Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012 (pp 86-89) for a definition of "Grand Bargain" in the context of intelligence oversight.

In this climate of introspection and uncertainty about the durable sources of legitimacy for US intelligence, IC leaders arrived at a consensus that the public's trust could best be recovered and held if they became more open about the intelligence profession and how it is practiced in the US. Resolving to "get off the back foot", Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Jim Clapper announced the Transparency Initiative in 2015 with the aim of enhancing public understanding of the US IC's mission, how it pursues that mission, the laws, and policies that constrain the intelligence agencies, and how these secret activities are supervised and overseen. Clapper issued "Principles of Transparency" together with an [Implementation Plan](#) and also established an "Intelligence Transparency Council" comprising senior representatives from the IC's 17 agencies.<sup>4</sup>

In practice, the IC's new emphasis on transparency resulted in more frequent public appearances by the DNI, CIA director, NSA director and other senior officials, declassification of voluminous court filings related to electronic surveillance programs, gathering and releasing statistics on the use of sensitive collection authorities, and well publicized public releases of high interest records like decades-old presidential briefings or, more recently, posting documents seized during the 2011 operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.

The IC would presumably admit that it has made less, or at least less observable, progress in reaching Clapper's goal of establishing the IC as a leader in reducing the massive volume of information being classified daily by the government.<sup>5</sup> In discussing these efforts to improve public transparency, Clapper and other IC leaders were forthright in acknowledging that much of the information that may interest the public, journalists, and private advocacy groups must remain secret to ensure the success of intelligence operations. Clapper also allowed that America's adversaries "have learned a lot from our transparency."<sup>6</sup> He argued, however, that this price was worth paying to win the confidence of the American people whom the IC ultimately serves.

The advantage ceded to US adversaries is not the only cost of greater openness by US Intelligence. The push for openness also raised concerns with US security liaison partners abroad who are intent on protecting their own personnel, operations, and the information they routinely share with us. It is safe to assume that the precise contours of the US IC's Transparency Initiative are also of keen interest to foreign nationals who may be weighing the potential benefits and risks of entering into a clandestine reporting (read espionage) relationship with the CIA.

Clapper and his team received grudging credit for their Transparency Initiative from the small circle of committed open government/anti-secrecy advocates.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the IC's focused engagement with the activist community raises the interesting – and still unanswered – question of whether the target audience for the ODNI Transparency

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<sup>4</sup> [Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community](#). 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Eric Katz, "[Spy Chief Instructs Intel Community to Serve as Government's Declassification Role Model](#)," *Government Executive*, April 6, 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Josh Gerstein, "[Clapper's Transparency Plan for the Intelligence Community Grinds Forward](#)," *Politico*, October 27, 2015.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

Initiative is or should be these “engaged elites” or the general public. While the Donald Trump administration is unlikely to champion open, transparent government with great vigor, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats recently reissued Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 107 affirming the IC’s commitment to civil liberties, privacy, and transparency. The revised ICD 107 expressly links “greater transparency” with enhanced “public understanding of, and trust in, the IC, the IC mission, its governance framework, and intelligence activities.”<sup>8</sup>

## How to Gauge if Transparency is Building Trust?

The IC’s Transparency Initiative assumes that:

1. A public that better understands the US IC will be more inclined to view it as legitimate and its work as necessary to protecting America; and
2. The gains in trust achievable by IC agencies through direct engagement with the public offset the mission and opportunity costs of conducting intelligence work more openly.

A further practical challenge that confronts IC leaders is judging whether their openness initiatives are working, and which activities (among the many available options) may be more effective in building trust than others. Waiting for the next intelligence scandal to erupt and gauging how the public reacts cannot be an overly attractive way to measure effectiveness.

Periodic polls aimed at measuring public attitudes about US intelligence likely offer the most useful metrics, but we presume the DNI’s General Counsel would disapprove any such proposal that could stir memories of Cold War projects by the CIA and FBI to shape US domestic public opinion. We note, however, that the same constraint apparently does not apply to our neighbors to the north as Canada’s cyber-security and espionage agency, CSE, just commissioned polling to measure the “knowledge, attitudes, and behavior” of the public toward that agency.<sup>9</sup>

## Our Project, and Other Relevant Polling

From May to June 2017, the Texas National Security Network fielded a nationally representative survey of 1,000 Americans with the survey market research firm YouGov. This is a report on the first round of a poll aimed at establishing a stable baseline measure of Americans’ overall perception of the US IC, its effectiveness (including in key mission areas like counterterrorism, foreign intelligence collection, covert action, support to policymaking, and counterintelligence), the IC’s perceived respect for the privacy rights of Americans and foreigners, and institutional responsibility for monitoring US intelligence activities (see Appendix A for precise question wording).

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<sup>8</sup> [Intelligence Community Directive 107](#), February 28, 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Alex Boutilier, “[How do you feel about ... spies?](#)”, *Toronto Star*, August 25, 2017.

Our goals in gathering and analyzing this information this year and in the future are: 1) to inform scholarly and general debate on the proper role of intelligence in our democracy; and 2) to help IC officials design public-facing programs that respond most directly to the actual knowledge, beliefs, and concerns of the American people.

There is little historical data on public perceptions of US intelligence, and none that mirrors the scope and purpose of this survey. In the years after the 9/11 terror attacks, various media organizations and academic institutions conducted surveys in reaction to specific events or intelligence policy topics that entered the mainstream political debate. For example, Gallup asked about the perceived “accuracy” of US intelligence in 2005 after it had become clear that the IC’s pre-war assessments of Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs were flawed.<sup>10</sup> The same year, Gallup, CNN, and *USA Today* sought Americans’ views on questioning captured terrorists after details of Bush administration interrogation practices were leaked.<sup>11</sup>

More interesting for fixing a baseline and tracking future shifts in public perceptions of the US IC is a project launched last year by the *Lawfare* national security blog. *Lawfare*’s project is aimed primarily at gauging popular support for specific national security policies, rather than the standing of institutions. Nonetheless, *Lawfare*’s regular monthly poll includes a question on confidence in the IC’s ability “to protect US national security.”<sup>12</sup> *Lawfare* also now asks about confidence in the adequacy of privacy protections in the conduct of intelligence and law enforcement operations.<sup>13</sup> For the record, the *Lawfare* poll reflects a stable public perception that the IC is effective, at least relative to the president, Congress, and other government institutions, and confirms that the public is skeptical about the government’s commitment to protecting individual privacy and civil liberties. Despite methodological differences, these results appear to correspond with our first round of polling. We expect the *Lawfare* project will be extremely useful for the same academic and official audiences we hope to inform.

Finally, we note the interesting surveys and analysis on intelligence topics by Amy Zegart of the Hoover Institution and Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Zegart’s polling through YouGov detected a decline in the public’s perception of the “accuracy” of US intelligence on foreign threats from 2012 to 2013, but a consistently favorable view of the CIA, FBI, and Department of Homeland Security as institutions.<sup>14</sup> She concluded that while Americans liked their security institutions, they did not trust their competence. Zegart also measured in the general public a low level of knowledge about the IC. More troubling for advocates of the Transparency Initiative, her polls revealed a negative correlation between knowledge and confidence levels. To know the US IC is not necessarily to trust it.

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<sup>10</sup> Gallup, [Public Doubts “Smarts” of US Intelligence Community](#), April 26, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Gallup, [Americans Frown on Interrogation Techniques](#), March 8, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Benjamin Wittes, Mieke Eoyang, Ben Freeman, [“Confidence in Government on National Security Matters: A New Polling Project,”](#) *Lawfare*, August 3, 2017.


<sup>13</sup> Mieke Eoyang, Ben Freeman, Benjamin Wittes, [“The Public Not That Fussed About the Surveillance State: Confidence in the Intelligence Community and its Authorities,”](#) *Lawfare*, November 8, 2017. For updated results, see Mieke Eoyang, Ben Freeman, Benjamin Wittes, [“Confidence in Government on National Security Matters: March 2018,”](#) *Lawfare*, April, 6, 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Amy Zegart, [“Real Spies, Fake Spies, NSA, and More: What My 2012 and 2013 National Polls Reveal,”](#) *Lawfare*, November 7, 2013.

## The Data: General Effectiveness

One central assumption in the design of this poll was that Americans would be more likely to hold a favorable view of US intelligence if they thought the IC were effective in performing its assigned mission. Consistent with the generally favorable view of our leading intelligence agencies reflected in other polls, 55 percent of respondents indicated that the IC “plays a vital role in warning against foreign threats and contributes to national security,” while only about 7 percent thought our intelligence agencies were “no longer necessary.” Some 12 percent thought the IC posed a threat to civil liberties, with men much more likely to hold this view than women (16% to 8%). Almost 25 percent of respondents had no opinion or indicated they lacked the information needed to form a view. Here, women were more likely to indicate this view than men (30% to 20%) (see Figure 1).

**FIGURE 1**



Millennials, those born in 1982 or later, were least likely to believe that the IC plays a vital role. Only 48 percent of them expressed this view, compared to more than 60 percent of the Boomers (those born between 1946 and 1963) and those born before 1946.

We see large differences in our pool based on knowledge. We asked two questions to assess people’s familiarity with foreign affairs. We asked them a multiple choice question about which country had voted to leave the European Union (United Kingdom) and who was the leader of Syria (Bashar al-Assad). High knowledge


subjects were those that got both of those questions right, which was 55 percent of the sample. Low knowledge subjects tended to be younger and more often female than other subjects in our sample. For example, about 55 percent of Millennials were low knowledge compared to 36 percent of Boomers. The knowledge gap between women and men was comparable to the Millennial-Boomer gap.

Sixty-nine percent of high knowledge subjects said the IC plays a vital role, while only 40 percent of low knowledge subjects answered this way. Nearly 11 percent of low knowledge subjects said the IC was no longer necessary compared to only 4 percent of high knowledge subjects. Thirty-eight percent of low knowledge subjects said they had no opinion or couldn't answer compared to only 13 percent of high knowledge respondents in our pool.

### Mission Effectiveness

To better understand why Americans hold a generally favorable view of US intelligence, we asked respondents how effective the IC was in specific mission areas: counterterrorism, foreign intelligence gathering, covert action, support to policymaking, and counterintelligence. The IC was regarded as most effective in combatting terrorism and least effective in covert action that we described as “influencing events overseas in favor of the United States.” Here are the specific results for each intelligence mission (see Figure 2).


**FIGURE 2**



In view of the high profile role CIA and other IC agencies have played countering terrorism since 2001, combined with the absence of a second catastrophic attack on the homeland, it is no surprise that nearly 75 percent of respondents judged the IC very effective or somewhat effective at “preventing terrorist attacks against the United States” (see Figure 3).

Although the IC’s performance “uncovering the plans and intentions of hostile governments” is less visible to the public than counterterrorism operations, the survey reflected a similarly positive public perception of the IC’s work in this area.


**FIGURE 3**



With this question on “influencing events”, we sought to gauge the public’s perception of CIA’s covert action capabilities. The results were relatively ambiguous, with roughly equal numbers of respondents choosing “somewhat effective” and “not very effective.” Independents viewed the IC as less effective on this measure than other groups. We are frankly not confident that our attempt to describe covert action in plain English succeeded or, for that matter, whether the public could ever be expected to knowledgeably evaluate this unique policy implementation role assigned in our system to the CIA.



FIGURE 4



\*\*\* Differences between D and R and between R and I statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ )


The US IC exists principally to satisfy the information needs of the president and his senior-most national security advisors. A thin majority of respondents believed that the IC was “somewhat effective” or “very effective” at helping the president develop sound foreign policies. Of course, successful intelligence support requires not only that the IC collect and evaluate useful information but also a willingness by a president to hear, trust, and act on these insights. It is unclear if the roughly 40 percent of respondents who answered “not very effective” or “not effective at all” may have been influenced by President Donald Trump’s public criticism of the IC and the usefulness of its intelligence products, though Republicans’ high evaluations of effectiveness on this measure suggest not (see Figure 4).

Public attention on the IC’s duty to protect classified information from disclosure is episodic, and most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of a well-publicized leak or the revelation of foreign espionage. A slight majority of survey respondents believed our security agencies were “effective” or “very effective” at protecting secrets. This assessment is more charitable than we might have expected with continuing debates over the Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden disclosures, China’s presumed cyber theft of government personnel records, and daily “policy” leaks of sensitive information from and about investigations of the Trump administration.

In contrast to the respondents’ generally favorable view of the IC’s effectiveness on other dimensions, they were notably more skeptical about the intelligence agencies’ commitment to respecting the privacy rights and civil liberties of Americans. About

60 percent of those who responded to the question rated the IC either “not very effective” or “not effective at all” at protecting privacy. Only 43 percent of respondents believed the IC was “very” or “somewhat effective” in safeguarding citizens’ civil liberties. Democrats, more than Republicans or independents, were likely to believe that the IC was effective in this regard (see Figure 5).

**FIGURE 5**




\*\* Differences between D and I statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ )

### Responsibilities of the IC

We asked respondents to evaluate four statements about the responsibilities of the IC, the agencies’ use of all lawful means to accomplish their missions, treatment of foreigners, information sharing, and respondents’ willingness to surrender privacy for added security. Here are the top-line findings on each (see Figure 6).

**FIGURE 6**



For more than three decades, the formal charge to the US IC from presidents of both parties has been to use “[a]ll reasonable and lawful means” to ensure our government receives the best possible intelligence.<sup>15</sup> Not surprisingly, more than 90 percent of those polled agreed or strongly agreed with that general statement of principle.


Without changing the longstanding order that the IC should employ all “lawful means” to gather intelligence, President Obama issued a 2014 directive requiring IC agencies engaged in electronic surveillance to provide “safeguards for the personal information of all individuals, regardless of the[ir] nationality”.<sup>16</sup> This voluntary extension of privacy rights to foreign nationals was one response to the shrill criticism of the US by European governments based on information about NSA’s global collection capabilities revealed by Edward Snowden. These restrictions on US signals intelligence gathering remain in effect, although a strong majority of those polled disagreed that the IC should be required to respect foreigners’ privacy interests. Here, however, partisan differences were large, with Democrats more likely

<sup>15</sup> [EO 12333](#) (as amended).

<sup>16</sup> [PPD-28](#) - - Signals Intelligence Activities, January 17, 2014.

than Republicans or Independents to credit the privacy interests of foreigners (see Figure 7).

**FIGURE 7**




\*\*\* Differences between D and R and between D and I statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ )

One of the principal recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was to improve information sharing between government agencies engaged in counterterrorism activities.<sup>17</sup> Enforcing this mandate was one responsibility assigned to the DNI in the 2004 intelligence reform law.<sup>18</sup> By 2017, though, only a narrow majority of respondents agreed that the IC was able to share information without compromising its effectiveness. Here, Republicans were less likely to support information sharing than other groups (see Figure 8).

<sup>17</sup> [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States](#), July, 2004.

<sup>18</sup> [Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004](#), Public Law No. 108-458 118 Stat 3638, December 17, 2004.

FIGURE 8



\*\*\* Differences between D and R statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ )

\* Differences between D and I and between R and I statistically significant ( $p < .1$ )


In responses mirrored by some polls, a majority of respondents disagreed with the proposition that it was necessary to surrender their privacy rights to prevent future acts of terrorism. Several other polls have found Americans more willing to give up privacy to protect national security, which may be a function of differences in question wording.<sup>19</sup>

Here, there are few differences by gender, save for differences on the need to surrender privacy to gain security, where women (49 percent) were more willing than men (40 percent) to surrender privacy to protect against future terrorism attacks.

In terms of attitudes towards IC responsibilities by age, we found younger generations more respectful of foreigners' privacy rights and more supportive of liberal information sharing than older generations (see Figure 9).

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, [Washington Post-ABC News poll June 20-23, 2016](#), NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll conducted by Hart Research Associates and Public Opinion Strategies, June 19-23, 2016, [Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll](#) May 6-29, 2014.

FIGURE 9



\*\*\* Differences between groups statistically significant (p < 0.01)

Here again we find sharp differences between subjects based on knowledge. High knowledge respondents were more supportive of the IC using all legal means to achieve its goals. However, they were less willing to surrender their privacy rights. Those with low knowledge were more supportive of foreigners’ privacy interests and sharing information. These inconsistent views suggest low knowledge subjects have probably not thought about these issues much so their attitudes could likely be influenced by elite cues.

### Supervision and Oversight

Finally, respondents were asked to select from a short list the institution primarily responsible for monitoring the activities of US intelligence agencies. The National Security Council was the most popular response. Nineteen percent looked to the director of the relevant intelligence agency. The president was cited by 11 percent of respondents, while Congress was associated with this role by a surprisingly low 20 percent. Curiously (and largely inaccurately), 21 percent of Americans believed that the federal courts and judges play the central role in overseeing our intelligence agencies. In law and practice, each of these parties plays some role in monitoring US intelligence activities, but the oversight roles of the president, NSC, and Congress are most clearly defined (see Figure 10).

FIGURE 10



We did not find strong differences here between subjects based on partisanship or knowledge.

However, we did find stronger differences between men and women and by age. On this dimension, men and women had some different judgments on oversight, with women (27 percent) more likely than men (13 percent) to identify the Congress as the key overseer. Men, by contrast, were more likely to identify the NSC, 29 percent to 20 percent.

In terms of age, we found Millennials more likely to identify the courts (29 percent) as an instrument of oversight than other cohorts (only 19 percent of Boomers cited the courts by contrast).

### Key Takeaways from Round One

While a majority of the American public believes the IC plays an important role in keeping us safe, younger people and those less familiar with foreign affairs (an overlapping category) had less appreciation of the importance of the IC. While the IC's effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks was generally recognized by our respondents, that was again less true of younger and less knowledgeable Americans. Our respondents were less generous in their evaluation of the IC's commitment to protecting civil liberties.

In terms of responsibilities, Americans were broadly supportive of the IC using all legal means to accomplish its mission, but they were divided in whether they needed to surrender privacy to remain safe. Interestingly, women more so than men saw giving up privacy as necessary to safeguard the country. Overall, Americans were not inclined to extend to foreigners the same rights as citizens enjoy against electronic surveillance, with some partisan disagreement.

Our respondents were divided in assigning different parties the principal responsibility to oversee sensitive intelligence activities. Neither the White House nor the Congress has demonstrated to the public its primacy in monitoring the US IC.

We hope that this survey will serve as an important benchmark of Americans' attitudes about the IC circa 2017 against which we can examine how views change over time. This, and other similar data, should help intelligence leaders gauge the impact on public support from the IC's ongoing efforts to be more open about its important work.

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## APPENDIX OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY QUESTIONS

### GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS

The United States government has a number of specialized agencies that gather and evaluate intelligence. Which of the following best describes your view of this "Intelligence Community"

- *It plays a vital role in warning against foreign threats and contributes to national security*
- *It is no longer necessary in an age when information on events overseas is widely available*
- *It represents a threat to Americans' civil liberties*
- *No opinion or lack the information need to express a view*

### MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

How effective do you think the Intelligence Community is in meeting the following responsibilities -

- Preventing terrorist attacks against the United States Learning the plans of hostile governments
- Influencing events overseas in favor of the United States
- Helping the President develop sound foreign policies
- Protecting sensitive defense information from foreign governments
- Respecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans

*Response options: Very effective, effective, not very effective, not effective at all*

### RESPONSIBILITIES

For each of the statements below about United States intelligence, please indicate whether you:

[RANDOMIZE ORDER]

- The Intelligence Community should use all lawful means to ensure the United States will receive the best intelligence possible
- In gathering information on possible threats, the Intelligence Community should respect the privacy rights of foreigners to the same degree as United States citizens
- The Intelligence Community can share more information with the American people without compromising its effectiveness
- Americans will need to surrender some of their privacy rights to enable the government to prevent future acts of terrorism within the United States

*Response options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree*

### OVERSIGHT

Intelligence work is almost always conducted in secret. In the past, United States intelligence agencies have exceeded their authority and used secrecy to conceal inappropriate activities. If you had to say, who do you think should be principally responsible for monitoring these agencies to ensure they act within the law and in the country's best interest?

[RANDOMIZE ORDER]

- 1 President
- 2 The National Security Council
- 3 Director of each intelligence agency
- 4 Congress
- 5 Federal courts and judges
- 6 Media and investigative journalists