


United in Goals, Divided on Means

Opinion Leaders Survey Results and Partisan Breakdowns from the
2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Opinion on US Foreign Policy

By Dina Smeltz with Joshua Busby, Gregory Holyk, Craig Kafura, Jonathan Monten, and Jordan Tama

OPINION LEADERS FINDINGS



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Executive summary

Partisan disputes among US policymakers seem to be growing by the week, whether on negotiations with Iran, immigration reform, or climate change. To what extent are these divisions unique to foreign policy leaders? How much do they also reflect polarization among the American public?

To examine these questions, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs revived its tradition of conducting tandem surveys of the US public and foreign policy opinion leaders in its May–July 2014 survey. Across party lines, the results reveal that the US public and leaders largely agree on the general direction of US foreign policy. But entrenched partisan mindsets and polarization present significant challenges to addressing today's major foreign policy issues. The results underscore several common foreign policy goals across party lines that are bound to get lost once the divisive 2016 campaign begins. Policymakers should set a higher bar and advance shared priorities while working to bridge their differences.

- ▶ Whether they describe themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or Independents, foreign policy leaders and the public generally agree on the most critical foreign policy threats, including cyberattacks, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.
- ▶ Leaders and the public both endorse continued US international engagement and support the US military presence abroad.
- ▶ Both groups see preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, combating international terrorism, and securing adequate supplies of energy as top foreign policy priorities.
- ▶ Majorities favor drone strikes, assassination of individual terrorist leaders, and air strikes against terrorist training camps and facilities.
- ▶ Majorities among the public and leaders say that globalization is mostly good and favor free trade.

This consensus may be surprising given current headlines. But the survey results also underscore clear partisan differences among leaders and the public on how to achieve foreign policy goals.

- ▶ Republican leaders and Republicans among the public emphasize US military superiority and strength as key elements of foreign policy. For example, majorities of Republicans among both groups consider US military superiority to be a very important goal compared to fewer than half of Democrats.
 - Republicans alone favor the use of ground troops to attack terrorist training camps and support maintaining long-term military bases in Guantanamo Bay.
 - Majorities of both Republican leaders and the Republican public support military force to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
- ▶ Democrats, by contrast, are more supportive of multilateral approaches.
 - Majorities of Democrats, compared to minorities of Republicans, favor working through the United Nations and using US troops for hypothetical peacekeeping enforcement in Syria and between Israel and the Palestinians.
 - While Democratic leaders oppose the use of force to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the Democratic public supports the use of force in this case.
 - Democrats are also more concerned than others about climate change.
- ▶ Independents, like Democrats, generally prefer to avoid the use of military force in most situations.
 - As with Democratic leaders, climate change is also one of the leading goals among Independent leaders.
 - Independent leaders are closer to Republicans in prioritizing US military superiority, while the Independent public is closer to Democrats.
 - On multilateral approaches, Independents fall in between the views of Democrats and Republicans.

United in Goals, Divided on Means

Introduction

The Chicago Council has long been interested in measuring the differences between public and leadership opinion on foreign policy issues, tracking the extent to which policy reflects public preferences, and identifying potential gaps between leadership and public understanding. From 1978 to 2004 the Council asked a sample of “foreign policy leaders” a subset of questions

The Chicago Council leadership sample represents a broad spectrum of those who are likely to influence US foreign policy because of their expertise and/or current or past roles in government or influential organizations.

from the Chicago Council Survey on American public opinion. These studies proved vital for researchers seeking to understand the relationship between public opinion and the views of policy leaders.

In 2014 The Chicago Council revived this tradition and once again conducted a survey of foreign policy leaders in tandem with the 2014 public survey. Using an online platform and a sample modeled on past Chicago Council leadership surveys, the Council asked hundreds of foreign policy leaders questions about pressing US foreign policy issues in the world today.

The Chicago Council leadership sample represents a broad spectrum of those who are likely to influence US foreign policy because of their expertise and/or current or past roles in government or influential organizations. These 668 opinion leaders include persons working in Congress and executive branch agencies; fellows at top foreign policy think tanks; academics at the top universities for international relations; leaders of internationally focused interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); leaders of labor unions, religious organizations, and multinational corporations; and members of the media writing on international issues. Throughout this report, the terms foreign policy leaders, opinion leaders, and in some cases, just leaders, are used interchangeably.

The results show that on many issues the opinions of foreign policy opinion leaders and the American

public coincide, though not always to the same degree. Both the public and leaders emphasize the importance of US leadership in the world, see common goals and threats, support the US military presence abroad, favor signing international treaties on a host of issues, and support globalization and free trade.

Yet the results also highlight fundamental partisan differences in the preferred ways to achieve foreign policy goals, including whether the United States should project its power through military strength or by working through multilateral organizations and instruments. On average, the partisan gaps between opinion leaders are twice the size of those between the public, especially when it comes to the use of US troops abroad, US policy on Iran, and US participation in a variety of international treaties. This difference

The results highlight fundamental partisan differences in the preferred ways to achieve foreign policy goals. On average, the partisan gaps between opinion leaders are twice the size of those between the public.

most likely reflects greater policy awareness, stronger attitudes, and more consistent partisan inclinations among opinion leaders.

Aside from partisan differences, the data reveal a few cases in which foreign policy opinion leaders are not in sync with public concerns. The public is much more concerned than leaders about the bread and butter issues of US job security and dependence on foreign oil. This is a traditional divide, which has been seen in the Council's previous leader/public surveys. Leaders are much more concerned about protecting allies' security. There are also some more specific disconnects between the public and leaders within partisan groupings on the issues of immigration, Iran's nuclear program, and international treaties.

Leader Survey Methodology and Limitations

This report is based on a leadership survey conducted between May and July 2014 among 668 foreign policy opinion leaders from executive branch agencies, Congress, academia, think tanks, the media, interest groups and NGOs, religious institutions, labor unions, and business. While the survey team worked hard to design a sample that would reflect broad networks of policy leaders on both sides of the aisle, as in previous Chicago Council leaders surveys, the final sample included a disproportionate number of Democrats (46% Democrat, 17% Republican, 37% Independent). For a comparison with previous Chicago Council leader samples, see Methodology, page 28. For this reason, the leader results are shown by partisan affiliation and not as an overall leader average.

To more closely reflect the composition of previous Chicago Council Survey leaders surveys, these data were weighted by target sample group to reflect the proportional representation of leader groupings within previous leader samples (see Methodology, table 8, for subsample group sizes of past Chicago Council leadership studies). Using these past weights required the exclusion of a “military” group also surveyed in 2014, as this group was not included in previous Chicago Council leadership studies. In addition, low response rates from business, labor, and religious leaders required heavily overweighing them. Therefore, individuals using these data for their own research purposes should use caution in interpreting the results from these small subgroups on their own.

While this leader survey should not be interpreted to reflect the views of elected officials, the respondents are influential members of their organizations, and many who are currently outside government service have held positions in government in the past. Additionally, while this survey’s sample was carefully and thoughtfully constructed to sample the full range of foreign policy opinion leaders, it cannot be directly compared to a scientifically executed public opinion sample (such as the 2014 Chicago Council Survey) in terms of margin of error or other familiar survey statistics. Despite these limitations, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is confident the results will shed light on the views of opinion leaders and improve the dialogue around US foreign policy and policymaking. For a full accounting of survey methodology, please see page 24.

1. US role in the world

Shared desire for strong US leadership and active international role

While many headlines over the past year have argued that the United States is in decline, both the American public and foreign policy leaders believe that the United States is the most influential country in the world today. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most influential, the public rates the United States an average of 8.6. Leaders from all parties rate US influence an average of at least 9.0 (Republicans and Independents, 9.0; Democrats, 9.2). China ranks second to the United States in terms of global influence among both

Large majorities of leaders and the public say that strong US leadership in the world is at least somewhat desirable.

the public and leaders, with the public rating China’s influence at an average of 7.4, Republican and Democratic leaders rating it 8.0, and Independent leaders rating it 8.2).

With influence comes leadership: large majorities of leaders and the public say that strong US leadership in the world is at least somewhat desirable. But there is a great difference between leaders and the public in degree or emphasis. At least six in ten leaders (57% of Independent leaders, 70% of Democratic leaders, and 90% of Republican leaders) say it is “very desirable” for the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs, compared to just over one-third of the public (37%).

Similarly, a much larger portion of leaders (94% Republicans, 97% Democrats, 92% Independents) than of the public (58%) thinks it will be best for the future of the country if the United States takes an active part in world affairs. While six in ten members of the public continue to support taking an active part, this is among the lowest readings in recent years.¹ A follow-up question reveals that many who say the United States should stay out of world affairs think the United States needs to focus on its own domestic problems before taking on international concerns. Still, majori-

1. For a discussion of these results among the public, see *Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment* by Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder, with Craig Kafura.

ties of the public have supported active participation in world affairs over the past four decades.

For their part, US policy leaders underestimate public support for international engagement. When asked to estimate what proportion of the US public supports playing an active part in world affairs, on average, opinion leaders guess that less than half the public favors an active part (42% among Republican leaders, 43% among Democratic leaders, 45% among Independent leaders). This misperception among opinion leaders helps feed the ongoing myth of American isolationism.

2. Top goals and threats

Key differences on defending allies, US military superiority, climate change, Iran, protecting jobs, and immigration

The results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey show that the goals for US foreign policy that rank highest in importance are the same among both opinion leaders and the public. Majorities say that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (73% public, 78% Republican leaders, 73% Democratic leaders, 72% Independent leaders), combating international terrorism (61% public, 84% Republican leaders, 63% Democratic leaders, 52% Independent leaders), and securing adequate supplies of energy (66% public, 72% Republican leaders, 52% Democratic leaders, 61% Independent leaders) are “very important” goals. Leaders and the

The results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey show that opinion leaders and the public rate the same goals for US foreign policy as most important.


public also share the same lowest-rated goals. No more than four in ten say that promoting and defending human rights in other countries, protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations are “very important” goals (Appendix, table 1A).

A similar trend is clear on the question of threats to US vital interests. Majorities view cyberattacks on US computer networks (69% public, 69% Republican leaders, 61% Democratic leaders, 67% Independent leaders), international terrorism (63% public, 69% Republican leaders, 54% Democratic leaders, 52%

Independent leaders), and the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (60% public, 68% Republican leaders, 56% Democratic leaders, but only 44% Independent leaders) as “critical” threats. The public and leaders also tend to converge on the least critical threats, which include disputes between China and its neighbors, the continuing conflict in Syria, the lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and economic competition from low-wage countries (Appendix, table 2A).

Across party lines, there is a great deal of agreement on US policy toward Asia, specifically China. Only minorities consider the development of China as a world power to be a critical threat to the United States (41% overall public, 40% Republican leaders, 27% Democratic leaders, 29% Independent leaders). At least six in ten members of the American public and

FIGURE 1



at least eight in ten foreign policy leaders across party lines think it is better for the United States to undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China than to actively work to limit China's growth (figure 1). In addition, solid majorities of both the American public and leaders support US government plans to "pivot" diplomatic and military resources away from the Middle East and Europe and more toward Asia (61% public, 79% Republican leaders, 85% Democratic leaders, 61% Independent leaders).

Beyond these similarities, the results on preferred goals and perceived threats show several clear partisan differences as well as some divisions between leaders and the public.

Goals particular to Republicans

US military superiority

Majorities of Republicans among the public and leader samples say that maintaining US military superiority

TABLE 1

US Military Presence							
Do you think that the US military presence in Asia/the Middle East increases or decreases stability in the region? (% increases)							
	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Asia	98	66	87	63	78	60	62
Middle East	94	66	65	56	63	48	56

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TABLE 2

Long-Term Military Bases							
Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)							
	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
South Korea	94	70	88	61	79	63	64
Germany	70	62	71	53	51	57	57
Japan	92	60	80	50	62	58	55
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba	78	67	20	42	32	49	51
The Philippines	84	56	67	47	67	52	51
Kuwait	71	55	55	47	45	42	47
Afghanistan	52	50	31	42	30	38	43
Turkey	73	47	65	40	60	43	43
Australia	72	44	61	38	53	43	42
Iraq	45	49	18	40	24	35	41
Pakistan	21	43	18	40	16	31	37
Poland	86	39	53	32	53	39	37

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is a “very important” foreign policy goal (64% Republican public, 84% Republican leaders), compared to just under half of Democrats (41% Democratic public, 46% Democratic leaders). Independent policy leaders more closely resemble Republicans, while Independents among the public are closer to Democrats (54% Independent public, 43% Independent leaders) (Appendix, table 1A).

On projecting American military power abroad, a large majority of foreign policy leaders (including nearly all of Republican leaders interviewed) say the US military presence in the Middle East and Asia increases stability in these regions. A smaller majority of the overall public (just half of the Independent public) agrees (table 1).

Specifically, solid majorities of foreign policy leaders and smaller majorities of the public support US

Republican leaders stand out in their solid support for the Afghan war. Three-quarters (77%, compared to 30% of Democratic leaders and 34% of Independent leaders) say the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting. Among the public, no more than a third feel that way.

military bases in several allied countries, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Germany. Majorities of foreign policy leaders, but only minorities among the public, favor bases in Turkey, Australia, and Poland. In each case Republican leaders are the most supportive. A majority of Republican and Democratic leaders and nearly half of their respective publics approve of bases in Kuwait, and solid majorities of Republicans and half of the Independent public approve of bases in Guantanamo Bay (table 2).

While there is only minority support for establishing long-term bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Republican leaders stand out in their solid support for the Afghan war. Three-quarters (77%, compared to 30% of Democratic leaders and 34% of Independent leaders) say the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting. Among the public, no more than a third feel that way (34% Republican public, 25% Democratic public, 23% Independent public).



Though more tepid than the example of Afghanistan, Republican leaders also tend to say that the war in Iraq was worth fighting (53% vs. only 3% of Democratic leaders and 14% of Independent leaders). Among the public, Republicans are more likely

FIGURE 2

Threats to the Vital Interests of the United States

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (%)

Iran’s nuclear program



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than Democrats or Independents to say the Iraq war was worth fighting, but this is still a minority view (40% Republican public, 22% Democratic public, 20% Independent public). While not majorities, Republican leaders and the Republican public are somewhat more likely than their Democratic and Independent counterparts to approve of US military bases in Iraq (table 2).

Iran’s nuclear program

Many more Republican than other leaders see Iran’s nuclear program as a “critical” threat, placing it at the top of the threat ranking among Republican leaders

Many more Republican leaders than other leaders see Iran’s nuclear program as a critical threat, placing it at the top of the threat ranking among Republicans. Republicans stand alone in this level of concern.

(figure 2 and Appendix, table 2A). Republicans leaders stand alone in this level of concern (75% Republican

leaders, 30% Democratic leaders, 31% Independent leaders). Despite these divisions among leaders, there is more cross-partisan concern among the public (66% Republicans, 58% Democrats, 51% Independents). The American public is also far more likely than Democratic and Independent leaders (and somewhat more likely than Republican leaders) to favor military force to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (see page 13 and Appendix, table 3A).

Goals particular to Democrats

Limiting climate change

Nearly nine in ten Democratic foreign policy leaders and a much smaller majority of the Democratic public deem climate change to be a “very important” US foreign policy goal (84% Democratic leaders, 54% Democratic public) (figure 3). This is reflected in the perception of climate change as a “critical” threat.

Climate change ranks as the leading foreign policy goal and threat among Democratic leaders.


Both Democratic leaders and public consider climate change to be a “critical” threat, with Democratic leaders showing a much larger majority than the Democratic public (79% Democratic leaders, 51% Democratic public) (figure 3). In fact, climate change ranks as the leading foreign policy goal and threat among Democratic leaders. By contrast, no more than a quarter of Republican leaders or public consider climate change to be a “very important” goal or a “critical” threat. Independents are divided on this issue. Independent leaders (50%) are more inclined than the Independent public (40%) to see climate change as a “very important” goal and as a “critical” threat (53% Independent leaders, 35% Independent public).

Goals particular to opinion leaders

Defending allies

Foreign policy leaders are more likely than the public to consider defending US allies’ security a top priority, especially Republican leaders (38% overall public, 77% Republican leaders, 53% Democratic leaders, 38% Independent leaders). In addition, majorities of leaders are willing to send US troops to defend South Korea,

FIGURE 3



NATO’s Baltic allies, and Israel if they came under attack, though majorities of the public are opposed in these cases (see pages 11–14, and Appendix, table 3A).

Goals particular to the public

Protecting American jobs and reducing oil dependence

For their part, more members of the American public than leaders think protecting the jobs of American workers should be a “very important” foreign policy goal (76% overall public, 37% Republican leaders, 38%

Democratic leaders, 40% Independent leaders). The same is true for reducing US dependence on foreign oil (74% overall public, 52% Republican leaders, 46% Democratic leaders, 44% Independent leaders) (Appendix, table 1A). These issues are important to more members of the public of all political stripes than to leaders. In fact, a slight majority of Americans say they would support using US troops to ensure the oil supply. Republican leaders agree (71%), compared to 24 percent of Democratic leaders and 33 percent of Independent leaders (Appendix, table 3A). Despite these pocketbook concerns, Americans are generally positive about globalization and free trade agreements (see page 16).

Immigration

There is also a gap between the public and leaders on attitudes toward immigration. Though still less than a majority, the overall public (47%) is much more likely than leaders (no more than 20%) to consider controlling and reducing illegal immigration a “very important


The public is much more likely than leaders to consider controlling and reducing illegal immigration a “very important” foreign policy goal.

important” foreign policy goal (figure 4). A strong majority of Republicans among the public (61%), however, do consider this goal “very important”—three times as many as Republican leaders. Similarly, more members of the overall public (39%) than leaders (no more than 16%) are concerned about the possibility of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States as a critical threat, again with large partisan differences. Public concern about an immigration threat is concentrated mostly among Republicans and Independents (55% Republican public, 42% Independent public, 21% Democratic public).

3. Attitudes toward military intervention

In principle, solid majorities of the US public and leaders support the use of US troops to deal with humanitarian crises, to prevent a government from committing genocide, and to combat terrorism. Beyond these items, there are several significant opinion gaps between leaders and the public, especially in

FIGURE 4



situations that call for the defense of a US ally or using military force against Iran (see Appendix, table 3A).

In some cases, leaders differ significantly by party affiliation. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to support the use of US troops to defend US allies. Democrats are more likely than others to favor participation in peacekeeping missions. Independent leaders are closer to Democrats on these questions, though they more closely resemble Republican leaders when it

comes to defending Israel against an attack and sending peacekeeping forces to Syria. Generally speaking, the partisan gaps among leaders are larger than the partisan gaps among the public.

General agreement on support for military force to combat terrorism

This survey was conducted before the battle against the Islamic State hit the headlines, but even then American opinion leaders and the US public shared significant concerns about the need to combat terrorism (Appendix, table 2A). Majorities of both groups describe international terrorism as a “critical” threat (63% overall public, 69% Republican leaders, 54% Democratic leaders, 52% Independent leaders). To combat that threat, majorities across party lines among both leaders and the public favor drone strikes, assassinations of individual terrorist leaders, and air strikes against terrorist training camps and facilities (Appendix, table 4A). A majority of leaders across political lines (but only 33% of the public) favors leaving some US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 for training, anti-insurgency, and counterterrorism efforts (figure 5).

There is more differentiation on sending ground troops. A modest majority of the overall public (56%) and a larger majority of Republican leaders (71%) say they would support US ground troops attacking terrorist training camps and facilities (as do 54% of Independent leaders). Only a minority of Democratic leaders (40%) favors the use of US troops to attack terrorist training camps and facilities (Appendix, table 4A).

More willingness among leaders to use force to defend allies

Reflecting public-leader differences on the importance of defending allies, majorities of leaders compared to minorities among the public favor sending US troops to defend allies in Asia and Europe. Roughly two-thirds or more of all leaders favor using US troops to defend South Korea and to defend NATO’s Baltic allies if Russia attacks. Majorities of Republican and Independent leaders say they would support using US troops to defend Israel if attacked by a neighbor (Democratic leaders are divided). On each of these, Republican leaders are particularly committed. In addition, Republican leaders are the only ones willing to use US troops to defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China (figure 6).

FIGURE 5





FIGURE 6


Support for the Use of US Troops

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)


If North Korea invaded South Korea




If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia



If Israel were attacked by its neighbors



If China invaded Taiwan



- Republican leaders
- Republican public
- Democratic leaders
- Democratic public
- Independent leaders
- Independent public
- Overall public

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Greater willingness among public to use force against Iran

For the public, high concern about nuclear weapons in the hands of unfriendly countries translates into a willingness to use force against Iran. Seven in ten members of the overall public (77% Republican public, 65% Democratic and Independent publics), support sending US troops to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Among leaders, only Republicans support the use of force against Iran (64% Republican leaders, 31% Democratic leaders, 35% Independent leaders) (Appendix, table 3A).


While the survey was conducted before the April 2, 2015, framework agreement between Iran and the United States that “shuts down” Iran’s path to nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, the survey did ask about the November 2013 interim international agreement with Iran that reduced economic sanctions in return for Iran restricting development of its nuclear program. The American public, regardless of political affiliation, and Democratic and Independent leaders favored

FIGURE 7

Interim deal with Iran

As you may know, the US and other countries have reached an interim deal with Iran that eases some of the international economic sanctions against Iran. In exchange, the deal requires that Iran accept some restrictions on its nuclear program but not end it completely and submit to greater international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Do you favor or oppose this interim agreement? (%)

Favor



- Republican leaders
- Republican public
- Democratic leaders
- Democratic public
- Independent leaders
- Independent public
- Overall public

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the interim agreement (62% overall public, including 54% Republican public, 96% Democratic leaders, 86% Independent leaders). However, only a minority of Republican leaders favored the interim deal (41%) (figure 7).

Military intervention in Ukraine

At the time this survey was fielded, Russia had already annexed Crimea, but the fighting had not yet escalated to eastern Ukraine. Russia’s territorial ambitions were only perceived as a “critical” threat by minorities (38% public, 32% Republican leaders, 23% Democratic leaders, 29% Independent leaders) (Appendix, table 2A), though public opinion of Russia was at its lowest level since the end of the Cold War, falling to a chilly 36 out of 100. In any case, support for using US troops if Russia invades the rest of Ukraine is limited to about a third of the public (30%). Leaders also tend to oppose the use of US troops against Russia, though a higher percentage of Republicans than Democrats or Independents favors using US troops against Russia (46% Republican leaders, 30% Democratic leaders, 28% Independent leaders) (figure 8).


Peacekeeping if a peace agreement is reached between Israel and the Palestinians

An exception to the pattern of greater Republican support for the use of troops abroad is on peacekeeping missions. More Democrats support using troops for such operations than Republicans, with Independents falling in between. Majorities of Democratic and Independent leaders and six in ten Democratic members of the public favor participating in a multinational peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (59% Democratic public, 83% Democratic leaders, 64% Independent leaders, 45% Republican leaders) (Appendix, table 3A).

Peacekeeping if a peace agreement is reached in Syria

If a peace agreement were reached in Syria, majorities of those with Democratic leanings (54% Democratic public and 61% Democratic leaders) support US participation in a peacekeeping mission (Appendix, table 3A). Outside the context of peacekeeping, only 17 percent of the public and no more than 20 percent of leaders support sending US troops to Syria (Appendix, table 5A).

FIGURE 8



Diplomacy and sanctions are by far the most favored options to address the Syrian conflict. Two in three members of the American public and over 90 percent of leaders favor increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria. A large majority of Republican leaders and about half of other leaders and

Two in three members of the American public and over 90 percent of leaders favor increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria.

the public favor enforcing a no-fly zone (48% public, 80% Republican leaders, 52% Democratic leaders, 55% Independent leaders). Leaders are much more likely than the public to support arming Syrian rebels (25% public, 73% Republican leaders, 55% Democratic leaders, 45% Independent leaders). Leaders are much more likely than the public to favor accepting Syrian refugees into the United States (at least seven in ten leaders versus 42% overall public) (Appendix, table 5A).

4. Leader and public attitudes on the United Nations and multilateralism

Broad support for treaties with exception of Republican leaders

Attitudes toward peacekeeping discussed in the preceding section reflect broader preferences toward working in a multilateral context. The overall public and most leaders support US participation in international treaties and working through the United Nations. But on this set of questions, Republican foreign policy leaders stand in stark opposition to prevailing support.

Solid majorities of Democratic and Independent leaders and the public favor US participation in international treaties to regulate trade in small arms and light weapons, establish rights for people with disabilities, address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and establish a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans. The Law of the Sea treaty is the only one to capture majority approval among leaders who align themselves with the Republican Party; majorities of Republican leaders oppose the other three treaties.² A majority of the Republican public supports the treaties, though in smaller portions than other partisans (especially the climate change treaty) (figure 9).

Greater resistance among Republicans to UN decision making

Solid majorities of Democrats and more modest majorities of Independents agree that “the US should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.” Only 30 percent of Republican leaders and just under half of the Republican public agree with this idea (figure 10).

When asked about specific UN activities, the public—especially those identifying as Democrats—is more positive than foreign policy leaders in its assessment of how well the UN is resolving conflicts through negotiations, authorizing the use of force to maintain

2. Leaders, but not the public, were also asked about treaties concerning the International Criminal Court and a nuclear test ban. Six in ten leaders with Republican affiliation (58%) and large majorities of Democratic (96%) and Independent (87%) leaders support US participation in a nuclear test ban. Only half of Republican leaders support the ICC, compared to a full majority of Democrats (49% Republican, 85% Democrat, 77% Independent).

FIGURE 9





FIGURE 10



international peace and security, and imposing sanctions to punish countries that violate international law. Majorities of Democrats (among both leaders and the public) rate the UN positively on preventing nuclear

Democrats and Independents agree that the US should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations. Republican leaders and public disagree.

proliferation, compared to minorities of other partisans (Appendix, table 6A).

On other UN activities, public and leader views align more closely. At least half of the American public and leaders rate the UN positively on protecting and supporting refugees, sending peacekeeping troops to conflict zones, leading international efforts to combat hunger, and protecting cultural heritage. Democrats are most likely to rate the UN positively, while Republicans are less inclined to do so. Independents are generally in between (Appendix, table 6A).

5. Shared support for economic engagement

Globalization and trade solidly supported

There is broad consensus among the public and opinion leaders on issues touching globalization, trade, and free trade agreements. Despite the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis, two-thirds of the overall public and even larger majorities of leaders say that globalization is “mostly good” (65% overall public, 98% Republican leaders, 87% Democratic leaders, 90% Independent leaders). Asked about trade agreements, half of the overall public and a majority of leaders favor free trade agreements that offer programs to help those who lose their jobs (50% overall public, 61% Republican leaders, 78% Democratic leaders, 77% Independent leaders). Only 14 percent of the public (as well as 37% Republican leaders, 5% Democratic leaders, and 16% Independent leaders) favor trade agreements *without* programs for those who lose their jobs. Compared to much smaller portions of leaders, three in ten members of the public oppose trade agreements altogether, with roughly similar proportions among partisan groups (figure 11).

Finally, both leaders and the public support the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated with the European Union (62% overall public, 100% Republican leaders, 74% Democratic leaders, 81% Independent leaders) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negotiated with 12 Pacific nations (63% overall public, 91% Republican leaders, 72% Democratic leaders, 83% Independent leaders).

Greater endorsement of foreign aid from leaders than public

Similar to past Chicago Council Survey results, foreign policy opinion leaders are more likely than the American public to see the benefits of economic aid to other nations. Majorities of leaders favor maintaining or expanding economic aid to foreign countries, compared to just a third of the overall public (figure 12).³ Leaders are also more likely than the public to support increasing economic aid to Ukraine (15% overall public, 52% Republican leaders, 56% Democratic leaders, 55%


3. Asked about military aid to other countries, a majority of the public (59%) prefer to cut back spending, along with Democratic (55%) and Independent (61%) leaders. Half of Republican leaders (50%) favor maintaining current levels of military aid.

FIGURE 11


Lowering Trade Barriers Such As Tariffs

Which of the following three positions comes closest to your point of view about lowering trade barriers such as tariffs? (%)


I favor agreements to lower trade barriers provided the government has programs to help workers who lose their jobs.



I favor agreements to lower trade barriers, but I oppose government programs to help workers who lose their jobs.



I oppose agreements to lower trade barriers.



- Republican leaders ■ Republican public
- Democratic leaders ■ Democratic public
- Independent leaders ■ Independent public
- Overall public


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FIGURE 12


Spending on Economic Aid to Other Nations

Below is a list of present federal government programs. For each, please select whether you feel it should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same. (% for economic aid to other nations)


Expand



Cut back



Keep same



- Republican leaders ■ Republican public
- Democratic leaders ■ Democratic public
- Independent leaders ■ Independent public
- Overall public

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Independent leaders) and African countries (21% overall public, 27% Republican leaders, 61% Democratic leaders, 50% Independent leaders). A larger majority of foreign policy leaders than the public also favor helping poor countries develop their economies as a way to combat terrorism (66% overall public, 93% Republican and Democratic leaders, 92% Independent leaders).

Conclusions

In general, more foreign policy leaders express support for US international involvement than the public, especially when it comes to committing US troops to defend allies, supporting a contingent of US soldiers to stay in Afghanistan for counterterrorism activities, providing arms to Syrian rebels, and maintaining levels of foreign aid. But the public is generally supportive of international involvement as well, despite its greater focus than leaders on bread and butter issues and its deeper reservations about deploying US troops abroad.

Though they differ in degree, both the American public and leaders emphasize the importance of US leadership in the world, see many foreign policy goals and threats similarly, support the US military presence abroad, and favor globalization and free trade.

- ▶ Whether they describe themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or Independents, the American public and leaders support strong US leadership in the world and support the US military presence abroad.
- ▶ Majorities favor drone strikes, assassinations of individual terrorist leaders, and air strikes against terrorist training camps and facilities.
- ▶ Majorities across the board support the “pivot” to Asia and cooperation with rather than containment of China.
- ▶ At least six in ten members of the public and at least nine in ten leaders say that globalization is mostly good. Both groups also favor free trade and back the TPP and TTIP.

Foreign policy leaders, though not the public, also agree on defending allies, using US troops in several conflict zones, and maintaining foreign aid.

- ▶ Leaders from all parties are committed to using US troops to defend allies in Europe and Asia, keeping troops in Afghanistan to work on counterterrorism

activities, arming rebels in Syria, and providing foreign aid.

While this consensus may be surprising given current headlines, the results highlight differences in the preferred ways to achieve foreign policy goals, including whether the United States should project its power through military strength or by working through multilateral organizations and approaches. These preferences are related to fundamental differences in partisan outlooks.

Republican leaders and the Republican public emphasize US military superiority and strength as key elements of foreign policy.

- ▶ Majorities of Republicans say that maintaining military superiority should be a top priority (64% Republican public, 84% Republican leaders), compared to just under half of Democrats.
- ▶ Republican leaders and the Republican public favor the use of US troops to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Democratic leaders are opposed, though the Democratic public is in favor). Iran’s nuclear program ranks as the leading threat among Republican leaders.
- ▶ While majorities across the board favor using drones, air strikes, and assassinations to combat terrorism, Republicans are the only ones who favor the use of ground troops to attack terrorist training camps and facilities.
- ▶ Republicans alone support maintaining long-term military bases in Guantanamo Bay.

Democrats alternatively emphasize multilateral approaches such as peacekeeping, working through the United Nations, and participating in international treaties. Democrats are also more concerned than others about climate change.

- ▶ Majorities of Democrats, compared to minorities of Republicans, favor working through the United Nations and using US troops for hypothetical peacekeeping enforcement in Syria and between Israel and the Palestinians.
- ▶ Majorities of Democrats favor—compared to a majority of Republican leaders who oppose—international treaties that regulate the small arms trade, establish rights for people with disabilities, and address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

- ▶ Eight in ten Democratic leaders and half of the Democratic public consider climate change a “critical” threat facing the United States. In fact, the leading threat for Democratic leaders is climate change. By contrast, no more than a quarter of Republican leaders or the Republican public view climate change that way.
- ▶ Democrats support the 2013 interim agreement with Iran that partially restricts Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for some easing of the international sanctions.
- ▶ A majority of Republican leaders oppose the interim agreement, though a majority of the Republican public favors the agreement.

Those who describe themselves as Independents generally fall in between Democratic and Republican views.

- ▶ Independent opinion leaders broadly resemble Democratic leaders in their attitudes toward military matters such as maintaining US military superiority, the appropriate use of force, and leaving troops in Afghanistan for training and counterterrorism operations. The Independent public aligns with Democratic public views on the use of force, but is closer to Republicans on the importance of US military superiority.
- ▶ Independent leaders are least likely of all leaders to say that defending allies is a “very important” goal and are generally least likely to support bases overseas.
- ▶ On the interim agreement with Iran, Independent leaders are closer to Democrats in supporting the deal. The Independent public also favors the deal, falling in between levels of Democratic and Republican public support.
- ▶ On multilateral approaches, Independent leaders are roughly midway between Democratic and Republican viewpoints on making decisions within the United Nations. Both Independent leaders and the Independent public support international treaties, largely in contrast to Republican leaders.
- ▶ Like others, Independents support free trade and globalization.

- ▶ The attitudes of Independents on climate change fall in between the views of other partisans. As with Democratic leaders, climate change ranks as one of the leading threats for Independent leaders (second only to cyberattacks).

Aside from partisan differences, the data reveal a few cases where opinion leaders’ views do not align with public concerns.

- ▶ Among leaders, no more than four in ten consider protecting American jobs to be a “very important” foreign policy goal. At most, half of leaders say that reducing US dependence on foreign oil is a “very important” goal. But these are among the leading priorities for the public. Between seven and eight out of ten Americans emphasize these concerns.
- ▶ Leaders, regardless of party affiliation, do not consider reducing illegal immigration to the United States to be a “very important” foreign policy goal. Neither does the Democratic public. But a majority of the Republican public (and half of the Independent public) feels that immigration should be a high priority.
- ▶ In many cases the partisan gaps are wider among policy leaders than among the public, especially on issues concerning Iran, climate change, military bases, and international treaties. This is not too surprising, given that foreign policy leaders are better informed on these issues and therefore express stronger attitudes.

In sum, this study shows that the foreign policy issues that polarize parties today—how to deal with Iran, the role of the UN, climate change, and the importance of US military superiority—will be challenging to resolve given the entrenched partisan mindsets among both opinion leaders and the public. But there are also many examples of agreement on the larger goals for US engagement overseas. It is worth drawing attention to these shared objectives as the country enters into a new election cycle that will undoubtedly exploit areas of political difference rather than consensus.

Appendix

TABLE 1A

Goals for US Foreign Policy

Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. (% very important)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Protecting the jobs of American workers	37	76	38	79	40	73	76
Reducing US dependence on foreign oil	52	79	46	71	44	74	74
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	78	67	73	78	72	71	73
Securing adequate supplies of energy	72	62	52	70	61	64	66
Combating international terrorism	84	62	63	65	52	56	61
Maintaining superior military power worldwide	84	64	46	41	43	54	52
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	20	61	4	35	9	50	47
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	60	46	21	46	37	40	44
Combating world hunger	26	25	40	57	40	38	42
Limiting climate change	24	22	84	54	50	40	41
Defending our allies' security	77	38	53	37	38	37	38
Strengthening the United Nations	8	27	31	50	30	31	37
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	18	23	40	40	42	30	32
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	39	24	20	31	24	20	25
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	11	12	14	20	6	17	17

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TABLE 2A

Threats to US Vital Interests

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (% critical threat)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Cyberattacks on US computer networks	69	72	61	70	67	64	69
International terrorism	69	66	54	61	52	61	63
The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers	68	66	56	60	44	55	60
Iran's nuclear program	75	66	30	58	31	51	58
US debt to China	19	56	22	40	39	47	47
Violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan	52	51	45	48	37	40	47
The development of China as a world power	40	46	27	38	29	37	41
The possibility of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan	55	39	20	45	17	36	41
Drug-related violence and instability in Mexico	6	45	22	38	25	35	40
Political instability in the Middle East	26	43	51	39	34	38	40
Islamic fundamentalism	72	48	35	35	44	38	40
Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the US	16	55	4	21	9	42	39
Russia's territorial ambitions	32	48	23	35	29	34	38
Climate change	20	12	79	51	53	35	35
Economic competition from low-wage countries	18	25	17	27	22	29	27
Lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians	1	29	17	27	28	22	26
The continuing conflict in Syria	23	25	27	27	20	21	24
Border disputes between China and its neighbors	33	20	15	19	20	18	19

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TABLE 3A

Use of US Troops Abroad

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
To deal with humanitarian crises	69	69	78	74	73	69	71
To stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people	59	76	83	75	72	63	71
To stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons	64	77	31	65	35	65	69
To ensure the oil supply	71	62	24	53	33	49	54
To be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians	45	46	83	59	64	41	50
If North Korea invaded South Korea	80	53	73	44	77	46	47
If Israel were attacked by its neighbors	57	52	48	41	59	44	45
To be part of a peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement in Syria	48	38	61	54	47	38	44
If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia	90	50	64	41	67	43	44
If Israel bombs Iran's nuclear facilities and Iran were to retaliate against Israel	48	54	25	40	38	36	43
If Russia invades the rest of Ukraine	46	36	30	27	28	29	30
If China invaded Taiwan	62	25	45	24	29	29	26

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TABLE 4A

Actions to Combat Terrorism

In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures. (%)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members enforce them	89	76	94	84	92	74	78
US air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities	100	82	78	67	74	68	71
Assassination of individual terrorist leaders	97	80	69	68	70	65	70
The National Security Agency collecting telephone and Internet data to identify links to potential terrorists	87	76	66	69	67	60	67
Helping poor countries develop their economies	93	60	93	75	92	63	66
Drone strikes to carry out bombing attacks against suspected terrorists	93	76	62	58	59	56	62
Attacks by US ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities	71	66	40	57	54	49	56

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TABLE 5A

US Policy in Syria

Would you support or oppose the United States doing each of the following actions with respect to Syria. (% support)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria	97	63	93	77	94	62	67
Enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria, including bombing Syrian air defenses	80	55	52	49	55	42	48
Accepting Syrian refugees into the United States	71	27	86	55	78	40	42
Sending arms and supplies to antigovernment groups in Syria	73	28	55	28	45	21	25
Sending troops into Syria	10	20	3	20	5	11	17

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TABLE 6A

United Nations

Do you think the United Nations is doing a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad job at the following.
(% very or somewhat good)

	Republican leaders	Republican public	Democratic leaders	Democratic public	Independent leaders	Independent public	Overall public
Sending peacekeeping troops to conflict zones	60	56	71	71	55	56	61
Protecting the cultural heritage of the world	48	56	73	72	62	55	61
Protecting and supporting refugees around the world	56	49	78	66	67	52	57
Leading international efforts to combat hunger	48	57	74	65	66	51	57
Authorizing the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security	14	46	29	63	22	44	51
Resolving international conflicts through negotiations	11	43	35	61	27	43	50
Imposing sanctions to punish countries that violate international law	23	42	43	61	29	47	50
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons	15	40	54	61	40	46	50

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Methodology

Leadership sample construction

The Chicago Council Survey team compiled the 2014 Chicago Council Leaders Survey sample using a variety of sources, drawing most heavily upon the Leadership Library (LL), a subscription-based online database that includes contact information for leaders in various sectors, including businesses, Congress, the executive branch, interest groups, labor unions, the media, NGOs, and think tanks. Since the LL has limited information for policy leaders in some sectors and does not cover other sectors, particularly academics, military officers, and religious leaders, other supplemental lists were used.

Academics

A list of 828 academics at 25 universities in the United States whose research focuses on international relations was compiled by the Teaching, Research & International Policy (TRIP) project from the College of William and Mary. The 25 universities were based on the top programs in international relations in the United States.

The universities included were American University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Duke University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, Ohio State University, Penn State University, Princeton University, Stanford University, Tufts University, University of California–Berkeley, University of California–Los Angeles, University of California–San Diego, University of Chicago, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities, University of Rochester, University of Wisconsin–Madison, and Yale University.

Business leaders

Using LL, contact information was obtained for vice presidents, presidents, or CEOs and individuals with a job function that is classified as “international” and who are employed by one of the 1,000 largest US companies.

Congressional aides

Using LL, congressional employees in the database classified as having the expertise of “international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense,” with one of the following job titles were included: chief counsel, chief of staff, clerk, committee staff member, deputy chief of staff, legislative assistant, legislative director, or professional staff member.

Executive branch officials

Using LL, employees of the Defense Department, Homeland Security Department, or State Department holding the position of deputy assistant secretary, assistant secretary, undersecretary, or deputy secretary, or with the word “senior” in their title were included. Also included were employees of any other federal department with the position of deputy assistant secretary, assistant secretary, undersecretary, or deputy secretary and listed with a job function classified as “international”; members of the White House National Security staff with the position of assistant to the president, special assistant to the president, senior director, or director; and US ambassadors.

Labor leaders

Using LL, individuals employed by a US labor union with the word “international” or “president” in their job title were included. To supplement the labor list generated by LL, the Department of Labor’s list of labor unions in the United States with more than 100,000 members was used as a reference to add the presidents and vice presidents of each union that met these criteria.

Members of the media

Using LL, individuals employed by news media organizations and classified as having the expertise of “international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” were included. This was supplemented with a similar search of CISION, a media database containing contact information and areas of focus for media personnel around the world. Media personnel sourced from CISION

were listed as working on international issues and/or foreign policy.

NGO and interest group personnel

Using LL, individuals holding the position of vice president or president at an organization classified as an “international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” NGO or interest group were included. In addition, any NGO or interest group employee with a job function listed as “international” or whose expertise was classified as “international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” at these organizations was included (NGO and interest group personnel were grouped together because some of the groups listed as interest groups in LL would be considered by many people to be NGOs, and some of the groups listed as NGOs would be considered by many people to be interest groups.)

To supplement this NGO and interest group list, the online Charity Navigator database was used to develop a list of leading nonprofit organizations that focus on international issues with a budget above \$13.5 million. This included organizations in the following categories:

- ▶ International peace and security (23 organizations)
- ▶ International development (71 organizations)
- ▶ Humanitarian relief supplies (34 organizations)
- ▶ Foreign charity support (16 organizations)

Presidents and vice presidents at these organizations were targeted for inclusion in the survey list, though vice presidents for administration, fundraising, and other nonpolicy fields were excluded.

Religious leaders

The religious leader list was based on the Chicago Council’s 2004 list of religious leaders in the United States, updated to account for changes in positions in the intervening period. This was supplemented with a list provided by Valerie Nash of Religions for Peace as well as names from *Time*’s 2013 list of the 25 most influential evangelicals in America. We judged the representativeness of this list based on the broader patterns of American religious life, as reported by Pew’s Religious Landscape Survey, part of the Pew Religion and Public Life Project. As the original combination of lists under-represented Catholic leaders, we manually added the heads of archdioceses within the United

States. This brought the sample list into balance with Pew’s Religious Landscape Survey data.

Think tank experts

Using LL, individuals employed by think tanks and classified as having the expertise of “international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” were included in the sample. This think tank list was supplemented with top US think tanks in international security, international development, and international economics from the University of Pennsylvania’s 2013 Think Tank Rankings. This produced a list of 27 institutions. Of these, four were excluded: the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER). Atlas and NBER are networks, rather than think tanks; BRIE is a research project, but not a research institution; HRW is primarily an NGO.

The final list of 23 think tanks targeted for additional inclusion were: the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Cato Institute, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Center for American Progress, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), Heritage Foundation, Hoover Institution, Hudson Institute, Peterson Institute for International Economics, RAND Corporation, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Center for Global Development (CGD), Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, and the Stimson Center (FNA Henry L. Stimson Center).

The supplemental list was then constructed using contact information for fellows, vice presidents, and presidents of these organizations. Vice presidents for administration, fundraising, and similar areas were excluded, as were fellows whose research was primarily focused on domestic policy.

Military representatives

In addition to the above groups, the Council also surveyed 517 alumni of the National War College. This

group differs from other sample groups in two key ways. First, this group was not included in past Chicago Council leadership surveys. Second, the military portion of the survey sample was not constructed in the same manner as the other lists. Instead, a request for participation in the survey was sent on June 11, 2014, to alumni of the National War College (NWC) from Col. Gene Russell, executive director of the National War College Alumni Association. This group cannot be accurately described as a military sample (because it did not include active enlisted members) nor as a veteran's sample (because veterans included would only be those that attended NWC). For these reasons, this group's results were not included in this report's analysis. We invite other researchers to explore this data, which will be made publicly available on The Chicago Council's website.

Fielding the 2014 Chicago Council foreign policy leaders survey

The 2014 Chicago Council Leaders Survey was fielded using an online survey platform. A series of emails was sent to target opinion leaders, with the first fielding email sent on May 19, 2014. From July 7 to July 16, follow-up calls were made to business leaders, labor leaders, and religious leaders. The final fielding email

was sent on July 28, 2014. The survey was closed on August 1, 2014.

Most survey solicitations came from Ivo Daalder, president of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, with a few exceptions. Emails sent to the executive list after June 5 were signed by Dina Smeltz, senior fellow for public opinion and foreign policy at The Chicago Council. Emails sent on June 16 and June 26 used different interlocutors for two lists. Messages to the religious list were signed by William Inboden, executive director of the William P. Clements, Jr. Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft at the University of Texas-Austin. Messages to the business list were signed by Michael Moskow, senior fellow on the global economy at The Chicago Council and former chairman of the Chicago Federal Reserve.

To avoid requesting the participation of those who had already completed the survey, each successive email excluded those recipients who had been recorded as clicking on the link contained within the email.

Labeling partisan identification

Respondents in both the public and leadership surveys were asked a multistage party identification question. The first stage of that question (1010, below) is the basis for the partisan groupings in this and in other Chicago Council Survey reports.

- ▶ Question 1010: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

A broader, seven-category partisan identification is possible through the use of the second stage of the question (questions 1015-1025, below). However, this also decreases the sample size of each specific group is therefore not used in this report.

- ▶ Question 1015: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
- ▶ Question 1020: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
- ▶ Question 1025: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

Overall, the partisan composition of the 2014 leadership survey resembles past surveys, as evident in table 7. Please note that prior to 1998, leadership surveys did not ask the partisan affiliation of respondents from

TABLE 7

Partisan Composition of Past Chicago Council Leadership Surveys (%)			
	Republican	Independent	Democrat
2014	16	38	46
2004	23	32	45
2002	28	31	41
1998	28	29	41
1990	22	34	44
1986	27	36	36
1982	23	38	39
1978	23	41	35

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TABLE 8

Past Chicago Council Leaders Surveys Respondent Numbers by Group

Past Samples	Average	2004-wt	2004	2002	1998	1990	1986	1982	1978
Administration/ Executive Branch	26	41	41	34	24	24	22	11	23
Business	55	38	38	38	63	63	62	63	55
Educators	63	75	75	75	62	62	54	56	54
House of Representatives	38	69	45	44	39	28	29	39	42
Labor leaders	29	32	32	32	28	32	29	28	19
Media	57	59	59	59	57	57	49	52	65
Private foreign policy groups	20	29	29	21	17	20	17	17	18
Religious leaders	48	51	51	50	47	47	41	42	58
Senators	19	31	20	21	20	22	19	14	16
Special interest groups	21	25	25	23	22	22	21	19	16
Total	374	450	415	397	379	377	343	341	366

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TABLE 9

Comparison of Group Responses Historic and 2014 Leader Surveys

	Average size of past samples	Final 2014 sample size	Difference	Weight Factor (Past)
Academics	63	272	209	0.43
Business	55	22	-33	4.17
Congress	57	44	-13	2.20
Executive Branch	26	98	72	0.51
Labor	29	13	-16	3.95
Media	57	72	15	1.44
NGO/IG	21	41	20	0.80
Religion	48	20	-28	3.07
Think Tanks	20	86	66	0.39
Total	374	668		

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Congress or executive-branch agencies. The numbers reported in table 7 reflect the remainder of the respondents. For other questions about the partisan identification of respondents, please contact the authors.

Leaders survey weighting and aggregation

Because there is no comprehensive listing of foreign policy opinion leaders from which to sample, there are a number of possible approaches to weighting and aggregating data from the different professional categories surveyed. We chose to weight each group to reflect sampling results of earlier Chicago Council leaders surveys (see table 8 for response numbers over the years).

One alternative approach would be to weight each respondent group equally. While this does not significantly affect the overall results, it also would have precluded a methodologically rigorous comparison of 2014 results to previous Chicago Council leaders surveys.

Based on these numbers, the average sample size (374) across various iterations and the historic average proportion by group can be calculated. While this may

not reflect anything more than the typical number of respondents in the past (and not reflect any wider criteria such as numbers or influence), using past weights is at least consistent with Chicago Council tradition. However, low response numbers from business, labor, and religious leaders requires heavily overweighting them and, in turn, giving lower weight to respondents from academia, think tanks, and the executive branch (see table 9).

Methodology for the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of Americans on US foreign policy

This report is also based on the results of a public opinion survey commissioned by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The 2014 edition of the survey is the latest in a series of surveys on American attitudes on US foreign policy going back to 1974.

The public survey was conducted from May 6 to 29, 2014, among a representative national sample of 2,108 adults, including an oversample of 311 Hispanic respondents and was fielded in both English and Spanish. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 2.5, including a design effect of 1.46. This margin of error is higher when comparing subgroups such as partisan affiliations. A full listing of questions asked in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey is available online at www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/chicago-council-survey-data.

The public survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of GfK's large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel®. The survey was fielded to a total of 3,905 panel members, including 759 in the Hispanic oversample, yielding a total of 2,243 completed surveys. Of the total completes, 1,914 were from the main sample (a completion rate of 61%) and 339 were from the Hispanic oversample (a completion rate of 45%). The median survey length was 37 minutes.

Of the 2,243 total completed surveys, 142 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,108 respondents.

Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

- ▶ Respondents who completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.

- ▶ Respondents who refused to answer half of the items in the survey or more.
- ▶ Respondents who failed three or four of the following:
 - ▶ Completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
 - ▶ Did not accurately input "4," refused, or skipped the question that was specifically designed to make sure respondents were paying attention. ("In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the list below.")
 - ▶ Refused one or more full lists that included five items or more (of which there were 22 such lists).
 - ▶ Respondents who gave exactly the same answer ("straight-lined") to every item on one of the four longest lists in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q50 or Q55).

Prior to April 2009, the panel was recruited using stratified random digit dialing (RDD) telephone sampling. Now the panel is recruited using address-based sampling (ABS) to cover the growing number of cell-phone-only households (approximately 97% of households are covered this way). Currently, 40 percent of panel members are recruited through RDD, 60 percent with ABS.

For both RDD and ABS recruitment, households (i.e., all eligible adults in the household) that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Internet hardware and access (if necessary), which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have Internet access.

The distribution of the sample in the web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the US population 18 years of age or older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, and education. To reduce the effects of any nonresponse and non-coverage bias in panel estimates, a poststratification raking adjustment is applied using demographic distributions from the most recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The poststratification weighting variables include age, gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and education. This weighting adjustment is applied prior to the selection of any sample from the KnowledgePanel and represents the starting weights for any sample [11].

The following benchmark distributions were utilized for the poststratification weighting adjustment:

- ▶ Gender (male, female)
- ▶ Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60-plus)
- ▶ Race (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, 2+ races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- ▶ Education (less than high school, high school, some college, college degree or more)
- ▶ Household income (less than \$10K, \$10-25K, \$25-50K, \$50-75K, \$75-100K, \$100K-plus)
- ▶ Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- ▶ Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- ▶ Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- ▶ Internet access (yes, no)
- ▶ Primary language by Census region (non-Hispanic, Hispanic English proficient, Hispanic bilingual, Hispanic Spanish proficient)

Comparable distributions are calculated using all valid completed cases from the field data. Since study sample sizes are typically too small to accommodate a complete cross-tabulation of all the survey variables with the benchmark variables, an iterative proportional fitting is used for the poststratification weighting adjustment. This procedure adjusts the sample back to the selected benchmark proportions. Through an iterative convergence process, the weighted sample data are optimally fitted to the marginal distributions. After this final poststratification adjustment, the distribution of calculated weights is examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The poststratified trimmed weights are then scaled to the sum of the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/GfK-KnowledgePanel.aspx.

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research associate, at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.

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